Balancing Safety and Availability: A Historical Perspective on the Pace of Drug Approval, 1950s-2009. by Meier-Abt, Fabienne C.
Yale University
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Yale Medicine Thesis Digital Library School of Medicine
2-2009
Balancing Safety and Availability: A Historical
Perspective on the Pace of Drug Approval,
1950s-2009.
Fabienne C. Meier-Abt
Follow this and additional works at: http://elischolar.library.yale.edu/ymtdl
Part of the Medicine and Health Sciences Commons
This Open Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Medicine at EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly
Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale Medicine Thesis Digital Library by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital
Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
Meier-Abt, Fabienne C., "Balancing Safety and Availability: A Historical Perspective on the Pace of Drug Approval, 1950s-2009."
(2009). Yale Medicine Thesis Digital Library. 56.
http://elischolar.library.yale.edu/ymtdl/56
  
BALANCING SAFETY AND AVAILABILITY: 
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE PACE OF DRUG 
APPROVAL, 1950s–2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the 
Yale University School of Medicine 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Medicine 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Fabienne C. Meier-Abt 
February 2009 
 
ii 
 
 
 
Abstract. Over the course of the past 50 years, drug approval processes have ranged from 42 days to more 
than 10 years. What are the consequences of slow or rapid drug approvals on drug safety and drug 
availability? How slow is too slow? How fast is too fast? These questions have engaged the public, the 
government, physicians and the pharmaceutical industry for decades. This essay adopts a historical 
approach to examine the search for the right balance between drug safety and drug availability in the 
changing political climates of the past 60 years.  
       Before 1962, the discovery of life-saving antibiotics fostered an emphasis on drug availability and the 
rapid marketing of drugs. On the background of the thalidomide crisis in the early 1960s, however, the drug 
approval process was reframed. The 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments ensured a new focus on drug 
safety rather than drug availability. Efficacy standards were introduced and safety standards raised, and as a 
result drug approval and drug marketing times increased.  
       During the 1970s, the term ‘drug lag’ was coined and rapidly endorsed by pharmaceutical companies, 
physicians and by conservative parties. The term referred to the unnecessary suffering of American patients 
as a result of the delayed market introduction of life-saving drugs in the United States. On the background 
of general consumer movements and as illustrated by the case of sodium valproate, patients, too, used the 
notion of ‘drug lag’ as a political weapon to fight government regulations on the pharmaceutical industry.  
       In the context of the Reagan Administration’s emphasis on economic deregulation and of the public 
health crisis caused by the emergence of AIDS, the political pressure on the Food and Drug Administration 
rose, and the drug review process was revised to emphasize drug availability rather than drug safety. In the 
late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, several measures were introduced, intended to reduce drug approval 
and drug marketing times, especially for drugs targeting life-threatening diseases.  
       Finding the right balance between drug safety and drug availability has been a controversial task. As 
illustrated by the case of gefitinib, the current system depends very heavily on postmarketing studies and on 
trust in the pharmaceutical industry’s ethical behavior. So far, however, the drug industry has not proven to 
deserve such trust, as exemplified by cases like rofecoxib. Hence, in 2009, the drug approval process awaits 
to be reframed again. A renewed focus on drug safety with more careful pre-approval studies and more 
thorough drug reviews seems warranted.  
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Balancing Safety and Availability: A Historical Perspective on the Pace of Drug 
Approval, 1950s–2009. 
 
1. Introduction 
In June 2006, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the human papillomavirus 
(HPV) vaccine Gardasil for the prevention of cervical cancer related to HPV via a fast track 
process. Accelerated approval programs, as employed with Gardasil, had been introduced in 1992 
and 1993 to provide rapid and widespread access to potentially life-saving drugs before the 
completion of large-scale and long-term clinical trials. Gardasil’s approval for the target 
population of sexually naïve pre-adolescent girls rested on two studies measuring immune 
responses at four weeks after the last dose of vaccine.1 The lack of extensive efficacy studies and 
long-term safety tests in girls aged 9-15 raised the question of whether the FDA’s decision to 
accept Gardasil for accelerated approval was premature. Groups like the National Vaccine 
Information Center (NVIC), founded in 1982 by parents of vaccine injured children, argued, 
“there is too little long term safety and efficacy data, especially in young girls… to recommend 
Gardasil for universal use”.2 According to NVIC, nobody knew whether Gardasil would make 
some pre-adolescent girls more likely to develop inflammatory autoimmune disorders or other 
diseases as teenagers or adults. NVIC further pointed out that the manufacturer of Gardasil, the 
pharmaceutical firm Merck, had used potentially reactive aluminum containing placebo as a 
control for most trial participants, rather than non-reactive saline solution. Because a vaccine can 
appear safer when compared against a reactive placebo than when compared against a non-
reactive control substance, the NVIC accused Merck of “flawed science” and concluded, “it was 
 
1 FDA. Clinical Review of Gardasil Trials. www.fda.gov/cber/products/gardasil.html, accessed 2006. 
2 Merck's Gardasil Vaccine Not Proven Safe for Little Girls; National Vaccine Information Center 
Criticizes FDA for Fast Tracking Licensure. PR Newswire, June 27 2006. 
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inappropriate for the FDA to fast track Gardasil”.3 For the United States, NVIC promoted the sole 
use of routine pap screening to prevent cervical cancer until more tests on Gardasil have been 
performed.  
The NVIC was not alone in questioning the FDA’s drug review process with respect to 
Gardasil. Several scientists pointed to the short trial durations, which prevented definite 
conclusions on the incidence of cervical cancer with Gardasil use at the time of the vaccine’s 
approval in the United States.4 Whereas this observation primarily inferred a need for further 
long-term clinical trials, it also raised more far-ranging questions relating to the pace of the drug 
approval process in general. What are the consequences of slow or rapid drug approvals on drug 
safety and drug availability? Who is interested in rapid drug availability, potentially at the 
expense of drug safety and efficacy? Who is interested in high safety and efficacy standards, 
potentially at the expense of rapid drug availability? What is the right balance between these 
conflicting interests and between slow and fast drug approval processes? Over the course of the 
past 50 years, drug approval processes have ranged from 42 days to more than 10 years. How 
slow is too slow? How fast is too fast?  
 The following essay constitutes a case study in the field of drug regulations. It discusses 
the power struggle between the pharmaceutical industry, physician organizations, patients and the 
government on issues of public safety, drug efficacy, drug availability and drug innovation. 
Whereas the public has traditionally sided with the government in promoting its safety, this has 
not necessarily been the case with respect to drugs. For much of the past decades, the public 
favored fast access to drugs over extensive proofs of drug safety and efficacy. On the background 
of the changing role of government in the late 1960s and early 1970s and the economic 
 
3 Merck's Gardasil Vaccine Not Proven Safe for Little Girls; National Vaccine Information Center 
Criticizes FDA for Fast Tracking Licensure. PR Newswire, June 27 2006. 
4 Hymel, P. 2006. Decreasing Risk: Impact of HPV Vaccination on Outcomes. Am. J. Manag. Care. 
12:S473-S483. 
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deregulation climate in the 1980s and early 1990s, this essay examines the tension between drug 
safety and drug availability.  
 Thereby, the essay adopts a historical approach to analyze the tradeoffs between long 
drug approval processes striving for high standards of proof for drug safety and efficacy, and 
short drug approval procedures aiming at the rapid market availability of drugs. A wide selection 
of primary and secondary sources and two carefully chosen case studies serve to document the 
positions of the pharmaceutical industry, physician organizations, patients, the government, and 
the media. The essay uses primary sources from scientific journals, newspaper archives, and FDA 
regulatory documents.  
Several authors have accessed this issue tangentially. The historian and journalist Philip 
Hilts, for example, argues in his book Protecting America’s Health: The FDA, Business, and One 
Hundred Years of Regulation in favor of substantial governmental control over the 
pharmaceutical industry. He harshly criticizes any attempts at providing more rapid market access 
to new drugs at the expense of loosened standards of drug safety and efficacy. Fran Hawthorne, a 
senior editor of the financial publication Institutional Investor, takes an economic approach to 
examining the FDA and the American drug regulations. In her book Inside the FDA: The Business 
and Politics behind the Drugs We Take and the Food We Eat, she partially reinforces Hilts’ 
conclusions by arguing for a strong position of the FDA. However, unlike Hilts, Hawthorne 
believes in a constructive together and a close collaboration of pharmaceutical companies, 
physicians, scientists, the FDA and the public. Arthur Daemmrich, a policy analyst at the 
Chemical Heritage Foundation, goes even a step further than Hawthorne. In his book 
Pharmacopolitics: Drug Regulations in the United States and Germany, he compares the 
American system of drug regulations with the German system. He illustrates how different 
regulatory solutions are explored in different countries to solve similar problems. According to 
Daemmrich, these specific solutions reflected the needs and national regulatory cultures of the 
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particular countries. Daemmrich concludes by arguing not only for the close collaboration of 
pharmaceutical companies, physicians, scientists, the government and the public within a country, 
but also across country borders, resulting in the “international harmonization”5 of drug regulation.  
The present essay offers a detailed study of a particular aspect in the history of drug 
regulation in the United States. It argues that the balancing of drug safety, efficacy and 
availability was a major issue in regulatory reform. Thereby, the creation of the notion of a ‘drug 
lag’ was a powerful weapon in the debate.  
The essay begins by describing the events which led to the drug regulatory changes in 
1962. The 1962 changes to the U.S. drug regulations were a crucial point in the history of 
American drug marketing and its governmental control. For the first time, drug approval was 
rendered an active process requiring an acceptance letter from the FDA. Before 1962, prescription 
drugs were automatically considered approved, unless the FDA intervened within 60 days after 
the filing of a new drug application.  
The marked power differential which existed before 1962 and favored the pharmaceutical 
industry over the FDA was reversed by the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the U.S. drug 
regulations. After 1962, the power to set the manufacturing and marketing standards rested with 
the FDA and the government, whilst the burden to prove a drug safe and effective lay on the drug 
manufacturers. Concomitant with the shift in authority, the pace of drug approval processes and 
the balance between drug innovation, drug availability and drug safety, became a major focus of 
discussion amongst physicians, pharmaceutical firms and the government. Their opinions and 
interests clashed on numerous occasions.  
One of these occasions was the approval of the drug sodium valproate in 1978. However, 
whereas the debate on drug regulations previously excluded the public and did not arouse 
 
5 Daemmrich, A. 2004. Pharmacopolitics: Drug Regulations in the United States and Germany. Chapel Hill 
and London: The University of North Carolina Press, p. 161. 
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extensive media coverage, the case of sodium valproate provoked patients to speak up and 
became the focus of numerous newspaper articles. Hence, the case of sodium valproate is 
interesting not only as an illustration of the different interests of the groups mentioned above, but 
also as a manifestation of the 1970s consumer movement and the concurrent new criticism of 
medical practice, themselves rooted in the 1968 counterculture. For these reasons, the case of 
sodium valproate constitutes the first case study in this essay.  
On the background of the Reagan Administration’s emphasis on economic deregulation 
and the emergence of the AIDS crisis, the essay then examines the revision of the U.S. drug 
regulations in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The new regulations aimed to shorten the time 
required to bring new drugs onto the market. The essay discusses the effects of the revised drug 
regulations as perceived by patient organizations, physicians, pharmaceutical companies, the 
media, and the government.  
 In order to demonstrate the struggles of authority between the pharmaceutical industry, 
the government, physicians and patients in more recent years, the cancer drug gefitinib was 
chosen as a second case study. The case of gefitinib appeared ideal because it constituted a case of 
extremes with respect to all aspects involved: the drug intended to treat the extremely deadly 
disease of lung cancer, which not only was (and is) the number one cause of cancer death within 
the United States, but also was (and is) a disease with virtually no effective treatment alternatives. 
On the basis of gefitinib’s approval in 2003 and the drug’s “life” in medical practice until its 
market limitation in 2005, the essay illustrates conflicting interests, challenges and power 
struggles relating to drug approval processes at the beginning of the 21st century.  
 Finally, the essay concludes by discussing the relationship between the pace of drug 
approval processes and drug safety and drug availability. It examines the present arguments for 
and against an emphasis on drug safety or drug availability. Extrapolating from the observations 
of the past 50 years and considering recent cases like rofecoxib and current topics like genomics 
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and personalized medicine, the cost of medical treatment, controversies over embryonic stem cells 
and over “vanity drugs”, the essay explains why a reframing of the issue of drug approval seems 
warranted.  
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2. The 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments 
Since 1938, the United States had a Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act that aimed to ensure 
the safety of marketed drugs. According to the 1938 Act, drug manufacturers had to conduct pre-
clinical and clinical tests to prove a drug’s safety. The FDA then had 60 days to review a drug 
application and file objections or ask questions. If the FDA did not request additional testing data 
or refused a drug’s marketing within these 60 days, then the new drug was automatically 
considered approved.6  
The case of the drug efocaine illustrates the process of drug marketing and the role of the 
FDA before 1962. The anesthetic efocaine was introduced to the market in 1952. The FDA had 
not intervened within its 60 day time period, thereby accepting a single small test on animals as 
sufficient for drug approval. Soon, however, the drug was found too toxic to be kept on the 
market. At least twenty-eight papers had appeared in the medical literature describing cases of 
severe side effects from efocaine. In response, the manufacturer decided to withdraw the drug 
from the market. Of note, all of this happened without the FDA’s knowledge, which only held a 
single file comprising a case report on the drug.7  
Some years later, after the initiation of investigations aimed at changing the position of 
the FDA, Hubert Humphrey, chairman of the senate subcommittee on reorganization, summarized 
his findings on the state of the FDA prior to 1962:  
“The more we have examined the handling of drugs by the Food and Drug 
Administration, the more we have been surprised, shocked and disappointed … Often 
 
6 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of June 25 1938. §505. 
7 Brittingham, T.E., Berlin, L.N., and Wolff, H.G. 1954. Nervous System Damage Following Paravertebral 
Block with Efocaine: Report of Three Cases. J. Am. Med. Assoc. 154(4):329-330. Clarke, E., Morrison, R., 
and Roberts, H. 1955. Spinal Cord Damage by Efocaine. Lancet. 268(6870):896-898. Parsonage, M.J., 
Taverner, D., and Wooler, G.H. 1955. Paraplegia Following the Use of Efocaine. Br. Med. J. 1(4925):1322-
1323. Hilts, P.J. 2003. Protecting America's Health: The FDA, Business, and One Hundred Years of 
Regulation. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 162-163. 
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testing had been going on in a manner which should have sent shivers down the spine of 
the medical profession … drugs intended for use by victims of chronic disease – day after 
day, year after year – were released by the FDA even before, I repeat before chronic 
toxicity tests had been completed on animals … shocking reports of injuries and deaths to 
test patients, as received by drug companies, have gone unreported to the FDA, or have 
been downgraded by skillfully-contrived half-truths, or have been reported accurately to 
the FDA, but virtually ignored … Drugs have been approved which the FDA now admits 
should never have been approved. Drugs have been kept on the market long after the FDA 
admits they should have been eliminated.”8  
Of interest, it was not the occurrence of drug tragedies or the feeble state of the FDA prior to 1962 
that started attempts to change the drug regulations in the late 1950s, but economic concerns 
regarding drug prices.  
In the context of widespread concerns about inflation in the 1950s, the populist 
Democratic senator Estes Kefauver started to investigate several industry sectors, including the 
pharmaceutical industry, with respect to “administered prices” or prices fixed by industry leaders. 
Starting in 1959, consumer prices for prescription drugs were examined in senate hearings, which 
focused on the large difference between manufacturing costs and the final market price.9 
According to Arthur Daemmrich, Kefauver “wanted to protect captive consumers and indigent 
patients from companies that colluded to set high drug prices”.10 In order to achieve this goal, 
Kefauver presented a bill in fall 1961, designed to increase competition among pharmaceutical 
companies. The bill also intended to increase the FDA’s authority to inspect and license 
manufacturers, and it introduced the requirement of drug efficacy for approval in addition to the 
 
8 Hilts, P.J. 2003. Protecting America's Health: The FDA, Business, and One Hundred Years of Regulation. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 163. 
9 Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly. Administered Prices. 
10 Daemmrich, A. 2004. Pharmacopolitics: Drug Regulations in the United States and Germany. Chapel 
Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, p. 13. 
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existing requirement of drug safety. Kefauver further argued for the federal enforcement of 
antitrust laws and the compulsory cross-licensing of drug patents. Especially these latter two 
provisions aroused intense opposition from the pharmaceutical industry and several influential 
senators. When Kefauver refused to accept revisions to his bill suggested by the Judiciary 
Committee, his bill seemed doomed to fail.11  
At this point, however, reports of birth defects related to the sedative thalidomide, 
appeared in the popular press, aroused public concern and induced Congress to have a second 
look at the Kefauver bill.12 The use of thalidomide by pregnant women had led to the birth of 
children with congenital abnormalities ranging from stunted arms and legs, abnormal hands and 
feet, to damaged internal organs. Between 1959 and 1963, some 10,000 deformed children were 
born around the world and thousands had died from their deformities before birth.13 
Approximately half of the thalidomide-damaged children were born in West Germany alone.14 
Because the FDA had not approved thalidomide and had prevented the domestic marketing of the 
drug, only seventeen cases of deformed babies linked to thalidomide were counted in the United 
States. Nevertheless, a public scandal emerged when it became known that the U.S. drug 
manufacturer William S. Merrell, Inc. had legally distributed over two million thalidomide tablets 
to some 1,200 practicing physicians in the United States as part of the drug’s testing procedure.15 
Numerous articles were published, such as the journalist John Lear’s in the popular Saturday 
Review, demanding greater government oversight of testing processes and protesting, “they 
 
11 Harris, R. 1964. The Real Voice. New York: Macmillan. Daemmrich, A. 2004. Pharmacopolitics: Drug 
Regulations in the United States and Germany. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina 
Press, p. 25. 
12 Kelsey, F. 1966. The Evolution of New Drug Legislation. BMQ. 17:72-81. 
13 Patrias, K., Gordner, R.L., and Groft, S.C. Thalidomide: Potential Benefits and Risks. 
www.nlm.nih.gov/pubs/resources, accessed April 2002. Hilts, P.J. 2003. Protecting America's Health: The 
FDA, Business, and One Hundred Years of Regulation. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 158. 
14 Patrias, K., Gordner, R.L., and Groft, S.C. Thalidomide: Potential Benefits and Risks. 
www.nlm.nih.gov/pubs/resources, accessed April 2002.  
15 Daemmrich, A. 2004. Pharmacopolitics: Drug Regulations in the United States and Germany. Chapel 
Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, p. 26. www.fda.gov/cder/about/history/, accessed 
October 2008. 
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[pharmaceutical firms] may begin using drugs on humans before safety has been established 
through animal test, and they have the privilege of keeping the patients in ignorance throughout, 
lest knowledge of the guinea pig status have some undesirable psychologic effect on the results of 
the experiment.”16  
In the light of such widespread public concerns, the drug testing provisions from 
Kefauver’s bill, combined with the consumer protection legislation from a separate bill by 
Representative Oren Harris, received unanimous approval in both the House and Senate. In 
October 1962, President John F. Kennedy, who had been pressing for radical measures with 
respect to drug regulations17, signed the Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the Food and Drug Act 
into law. New approval requirements of multiple prolonged testing steps were introduced to raise 
the safety standards, and proof of drug efficacy was added to the approval criteria in addition to 
the existing criterion of drug safety. Furthermore, explicit FDA approval was now a prerequisite 
for drug marketing, and FDA permission was required for the distribution of drugs to patients in 
clinical trials. Unlike before, the FDA now had authority over every stage of drug testing from 
laboratory to clinic. The FDA set the standards for “Good Manufacturing Practice” and reinforced 
its norms by regular plant inspections.18 The new regulations required the pharmaceutical 
companies to adapt their pre-clinical and clinical testing practices. Drug manufacturers were 
expected to perform extensive animal studies, to initiate formal arrangements with physicians 
carrying out clinical trials, and to apply complex statistical evaluations to demonstrate drug safety 
and efficacy. To further increase patient protection, clinical investigations by law involved three 
phases: Phase I trials comprised drug dosage tests in a small number of healthy subjects and 
intended to prove the safety of the drug and identify the tolerable dose range. Phase II trials 
involved initial tests on a limited number of patients with the disease. They were designed to 
 
16 Lear, J. The Unfinished Story of Thalidomide. Saturday Review, September 1 1962, 40-42. 
17 Hilts, P.J. 2003. Protecting America's Health. The FDA, Business, and One Hundred Years of Regulation. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 158. 
18 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as amended. § 505 (d), 1962. 
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establish the efficacy and suitable dosage of the drug. Phase III trials constituted large scale 
controlled clinical trials within the target population. During Phase III trials, the drug was 
expected to demonstrate its potential safety and efficacy under the anticipated conditions of 
usage.19  
The enactment of the Kefauver-Harris Amendments set off an avalanche of protests from 
the pharmaceutical industry and physician organizations such as the American Medical 
Association (AMA).20 Over 300 written objections were filed, expressing concerns over inflexible 
drug testing protocols and excessive and unnecessary record keeping. Fears were raised that the 
new regulations might delay the marketing of new drugs and thereby deny life-saving measures to 
patients who needed them.21 Furthermore, drug manufacturers predicted a decrease in drug 
innovation in the United States as a consequence of the Amendments. They warned that American 
drug businesses would have to cut expansion plans and might have to move out of the United 
States, thereby weakening America’s position as an economic force.22  
Illustrative of the pharmaceutical industry’s viewpoint, Irwin Winter, Vice-President of 
the pharmaceutical company G.D. Searle and Co., charged in 1964, “the development of a new 
drug under today’s conditions is a much slower and more expensive process”.23 He explained that 
the insistence on the submission of all data, including all laboratory reports, for any conclusion of 
a clinical investigation was a most demanding, time-consuming and expensive task. It resulted in 
drug applications of enormous size, frequently counting more than 80,000 sheets of paper. Winter 
further pointed out that an increase in the size of drug applications also meant an enormous 
 
19 New Federal Regulations for the Control of New Drug Testing in Humans. J. New Drugs. 1962, 373-376. 
Daemmrich, A. 2004. Pharmacopolitics: Drug Regulations in the United States and Germany. Chapel Hill 
and London: The University of North Carolina Press, p. 28. Levy, J. 1982. The FDA Maze. Cutis. 29:54-60. 
20 Neibel, O.J. 1963. Rules, Regulations and Research. New Physician. 12:A85-A87. 
21 New Federal Regulations for the Control of New Drug Testing in Humans. J. New Drugs. 1962, 373-376. 
22 Hilts, P.J. 2003. Protecting America's Health: The FDA, Business, and One Hundred Years of 
Regulation. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 161. 
23 Winter, I. 1964. Problems in Drug Development as They Relate to the Pharmaceutical Industry. J. New 
Drugs. 40:306-311. 
12 
 
 
 
                                                
increase in the workload imposed on the FDA. Frequently, the FDA would take six months to 
view an application just to return it as “incomplete”. Winter complained that letters from the FDA 
used the term “more”, meaning more experiments and tests, “almost as if building a legal defense, 
not a scientific argument”.24 Thereby, Winter indirectly referred to the problem of interpreting the 
words “adequate and well-controlled studies”, which were required under the Amendments but 
not strictly defined. It appears that the FDA and the pharmaceutical industry had different ideas 
about what “adequate” and “well-controlled” exactly meant.  
Furthermore, Winter criticized that it was difficult to have independent investigators 
under the new regulations because of the tremendous amount of formalities now required. This 
problem was brought up also by many physicians and will be discussed from their perspective 
later. Together with the increased number of required clinical trials, these circumstances pressured 
many pharmaceutical firms into establishing their own hospital ward systems. Such undertakings 
were time-consuming, extremely costly, and, thus, posed a serious problem especially to smaller 
companies.25 John Krantz, Professor of Pharmacology at the University of Maryland School of 
Medicine, confirmed this, “several presidents of smaller companies have told me personally that 
they have abandoned all research efforts in the field of new drugs”.26 It appeared that small 
companies could not afford the type of research required under the new regulations. Whereas it 
might be expected that the resulting reduction in competition on the drug market was welcomed 
by the larger pharmaceutical companies, it seems that their own agonies with the Amendments 
more than offset their apparent new advantage over the smaller pharmaceutical firms. According 
to Krantz, the larger pharmaceutical companies were not able to develop and market nearly as 
many new drugs in the years immediately following the new regulations as they were prior to the 
passage of the Amendments. In 1966, Krantz predicted not only financial difficulties for the 
 
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Krantz, JJ. 1966. New Drugs and the Kefauver-Harris Amendment. J. New Drugs. 6:77-79. 
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pharmaceutical industry, but also a marked decrease in total health progress for the years 
following the implementation of the Kefauver-Harris Amendments.27  
As important cause for the expected drop in American drug innovation, Krantz specified 
the “appalling” time lags in getting information from the FDA, which in turn increased the time 
span for a new drug to reach the market. According to Krantz, the FDA was unprepared and 
insufficiently qualified to assume its new responsibilities. He criticized, “FDA has wavered, 
procrastinated, and quaked with indecision on rulings which often they are unqualified to make, 
owing to the multifaceted areas of medical science and medical practice involved”.28 Following 
Krantz’s reasoning, such lack in qualification and competence, together with the enormous 
increase in workload, led to the time lags at the FDA that would ultimately decrease drug 
innovation in the United States.  
Krantz’s charge of the FDA’s incompetence with respect to the authority over the 
efficacy of drugs was shared by many American physicians. Theodore Klumpp, MD, President of 
Winthrop Laboratories and FDA alumnus, spoke in the name of American physicians when he 
accused the FDA of developing “awesome powers … over matters falling within the area 
generally known as medical opinion”.29 Klumpp felt that the new regulations substituted the 
judgment of the FDA for that of physicians, including clinical investigators. Klumpp viewed this 
development as very problematic. He reasoned that it took years to decades of widespread clinical 
experience to evaluate the relative merits of a drug. The FDA, Klumpp argued, did not have this 
experience or knowledge, yet it sought to become the arbiter of medical opinion in the matter of 
drug efficacy. In dismay, Klumpp demanded, “in the long run the physicians of this country must 
be the judges of a drug’s efficacy and of its safety”.30 In Klumpp’s and many American 
 
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid.  
29 Klumpp, T. 1963. Regulations Affecting Drug Research and Development: A Historical Perspective. J. 
New Drugs. 41:212-20. 
30 Ibid.  
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physicians’ eyes, the new regulations meant a return “to the Dark Ages”. Before the 
Amendments, “experienced” physicians had decided what was safe and what worked. As the 
historian and journalist Hilts pointed out, before 1962, the final arbiter was an “expert”, not a 
governmental institution and not empirical scientific evidence. The new regulations placed 
experts in the second place, behind the FDA and behind scientific evidence.31 Many physicians 
felt deprived of an authority, which they had held firmly in their hands for decades. Furthermore, 
physicians argued that the control over drug efficacy studies had been assigned to an institution 
which was incompetent to effectively deal with it. Just like the pharmaceutical industry, 
physicians feared this incompetence to cause increased drug review times, thereby decreasing 
innovation in drug development and precipitating a halt in medical progress.  
Along the same lines, the executive director of the college of American pathologists, 
Oliver Neibel, pointed out that the average physician at the FDA received $12,000-$15,000 per 
year in 1963. These were the people who had to evaluate the results, opinions, and tests of top rate 
clinical pharmacologists and physicians who were engaged in drug investigations, tasks that 
called for great knowledge and talent. Neibel argued, “you can’t buy that kind of talent for that 
kind of money”.32 He thus demanded that the FDA’s appropriation be increased “so it can hire 
competent people to make the evaluations they now are required to make”. Neibel hoped that by 
providing the FDA with more money and a larger staff, “we won’t have valuable products 
withheld from the market for months and years because FDA can’t get around to evaluating the 
voluminous reports being required”.33  
Neibel also expressed the fear of many American physician practitioners that the new 
regulations were going to drive them out of the clinical drug testing process. He explained how up 
until now, the third phase of clinical trials had taken place largely in the offices of practicing 
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physicians. However, after the Kefauver-Harris Amendments, clinical investigators were required 
to complete an enormous amount of paper work that was incompatible with carrying out the 
duties of a practicing physician at the same time. Neibel pointed out, “all of this information has 
to be provided, all of these records have to be kept. Where and how can the busy practitioner have 
the time to participate in this kind of study and still treat the sick…?”34 As noted above, the loss 
of practicing physicians as clinical investigators created pressure on pharmaceutical firms to 
establish their own hospital ward systems for clinical research. This was expensive, time-
consuming and added to the delay in bringing new drugs to the market.  
In many ways, American physicians were aligned with the pharmaceutical industry in 
opposing the FDA and the new regulations during the years immediately following the 
implementation of the Kefauver-Harris Amendments, despite for different reasons. Drug 
manufacturers feared a decrease in drug innovation as a result of the Amendments and 
concomitant decreases in their profits. Physicians dreaded a potential decrease in drug innovation 
because it could deprive their patients of life-saving measures. Furthermore, physicians resented 
the government in taking over what they considered part of their authority. Both groups were set 
to “fight them [FDA] every step of the way”.35  
The FDA stood in the center of the criticism outlined above. How did it react? As might 
be expected, the FDA did not turn a deaf ear to the accusations from the pharmaceutical industry 
and American physicians. In response to the charge of inadequately qualified personnel at the 
FDA making decisions that ought to be made by experienced physicians, FDA Commissioner 
George Larrick countered, “the average practicing physician skilled as he may be in making 
decisions with regard to individual drugs to be administered to individual patients, is not 
necessarily qualified to make broader decisions about permitting nationwide marketing of a 
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drug”.36 According to Larrick, practicing physicians often failed to see “the broader picture”. He 
argued that neither the physician who had encountered a rare but serious reaction from a drug, nor 
the physician who had successfully used the same drug on a hundred patients was in a desirable 
position to make a good judgment about the drug’s safety and efficacy. Larrick further questioned 
whether busy physicians were capable of keeping abreast of all the new developments on the drug 
market. Even though Larrick himself did not do so, this thought can be extended to the previous 
paragraphs: if practicing physicians, according to their own accounts, did not have the time to fill 
out investigational reports, did they have the time to study the efficacy details of the drugs on the 
market? Larrick also pointed out that the FDA employed physicians and pharmacologists skilled 
in making individual decisions and gave them “the training needed to make recommendations 
involving the broader picture of the relative merits of a drug for all of society”.37 Thereby, the 
FDA intended to create people who both had the knowledge of practicing physicians and 
pharmacologists as well as the ability to see the broader context. Hence, from the FDA’s 
perspective, the charge of its incompetence was invalid and, thus, could not cause a decrease in 
health progress.  
The same was not true for the charge of increased workloads overwhelming the FDA. 
Larrick admitted that the workload which fell upon the FDA’s medical officers was “enormous”. 
Per working day, the FDA received on average four applications, each thousands of pages long. 
Larrick defended the FDA, “we have taken a number of concrete steps to improve our operating 
procedures”.38 Thereby, he referred to the internal reorganization of the agency and the recent 
recruitments that the FDA had undergone. Whereas in 1953, the FDA had only two medical 
officers, and six full-time and four part-time medical officers in 1960, in 1964, the FDA counted 
41 full-time and three part-time medical officers. Nevertheless, Larrick’s arguments can be 
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interpreted as an acknowledgment of the Amendments’ and FDA’s contribution to potential 
delays in the marketing of new drugs.  
In defense of the new regulations, Larrick reasoned that the Kefauver-Harris 
Amendments merely reflected the growing needs of the American society, “our Nation would no 
more have accepted new drug safety provisions in 1906 than it would permit the abandonment of 
new drug effectiveness requirements in 1964”.39 According to Larrick, the public and its 
representatives in Congress and the Senate had assigned increased powers to the government and 
the FDA because they felt a need for more safety on the drug market. Furthermore, Larrick 
stressed that the FDA did not intend to cause unnecessary difficulties for the pharmaceutical 
industry or the practicing physicians of the United States, and that the purpose of the new 
regulations was to protect the public whilst imposing “only necessary restrictions on the conduct 
of investigational drug research”.40 Again, it appears that the pharmaceutical industry, American 
physicians and the FDA had different notions about the exact meaning of certain expressions used 
in the Amendments. In this case, the dispute centered around the interpretation of “necessary 
restrictions”.  
James Goddard, who followed Larrick as FDA commissioner in 1966, was explicitly 
aware of the new powers, which – at least according to Larrick – the public had granted the FDA. 
At the Pharmaceutical Manufacturer’s Association meeting in 1962, he addressed the company 
executives in a new tone. Countering the pharmaceutical industry’s accusations regarding the 
FDA’s work, he expressed how “shocked” he was at the low quality of many investigational new 
drug applications, “the hand of the amateur is evident too often for my comfort. So-called 
research and so-called studies are submitted by the cartonful…” Goddard continued that he could 
not take such applications seriously and informed the executives of his instructions to the FDA 
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medical officers to cancel “unprofessional investigational new drug applications” immediately. 
With new authority, the FDA Commissioner Goddard scolded the executives, “if the sponsoring 
company is imprudent enough to waste stockholder’s money on low quality work, then that 
company must bear the consequence of such waste”.41 He added that the FDA should not be 
expected to waste public money by reviewing such low quality work. Furthermore, Goddard 
accused the pharmaceutical industry of trying to deceive the FDA and threaten its members, “I 
have been shocked at clear attempts to slip something by us. I am deeply disturbed at the constant, 
direct, personal pressure some industry representatives have placed upon our people.”42 Goddard 
warned the executives that such actions by the pharmaceutical industry built up pressure for even 
tighter federal control of the drug industry. Demonstrative of the FDA’s newly gained powers, 
Goddard could now threaten the drug manufacturers, “I will be candid with you … the 
pharmaceutical industry as you and I know it today may be altered significantly, altered beyond 
your present fear …”43 And indeed, according to the FDA homepage, “Go-Go” Goddard, as he 
was known to his staff, displayed much “regulatory enthusiasm” during his years as the 
commissioner of the FDA.44 Thereby, the pharmaceutical industry was the main bearer of 
Goddard’s efforts. For example, in Goddard’s first year at the FDA, drug recalls grew by nearly 
75%. Clearly, the power differential had changed, perhaps even reversed.  
Patient voices and the media were comparatively quiescent immediately after the 
implementation of the Kefauver-Harris Amendments. Their main concern had been the 
thalidomide crisis, which was effectively dealt with by the new regulations. Furthermore, before 
the 1970s, patients were not perceived as a separate interest group, but were felt to be best 
represented by their physicians. According to Jerome Halperin of the Food and Drug Law 
Institute in Washingtion, D.C., “medicine was one of those things where the patient was very 
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passive. The FDA for the most part focused on the intermediary, the physician.”45 It wasn’t until 
the 1970s that patient organizations developed a voice on their own and started to focus on drug 
approval processes. They did so as part of general consumer movements, which had been fueled 
by the 1968 counterculture activism and resulted in widespread criticism of governmental 
institutions and regulations. The consumer groups formed in the early 1970s, including the Public 
Citizens advocacy organization, its Health Research Group, and the Center for Science in the 
Public Interest, were bold and focused on their goals. For the most part, they had small budgets 
and used more volunteers than paid workers, forcing them to center on very specific issues. In the 
case of the Public Citizens’ Health Research Group and the Center for Science in the Public 
Interest, the emphasis was laid on the FDA and its regulations.46 The consumer movement 
pressurized governmental institutions to make their files public and allow American citizens 
access to government meetings. Hence, while 90% of FDA files were secret before 1969, during 
the 1970s, 90% of FDA files became open to the public, permitting patient organizations access to 
data on drug trials and adverse reactions and pharmacologic details of drugs.47 Furthermore, FDA 
meetings with expert committees were now held in the open for the most part, giving patients the 
opportunity to attend and sometimes to contribute, even if not according to protocol. 
Concomitantly, the feminist movement in the early 1970s and the discussions on the introduction 
of the oral contraceptive pill had provoked public criticism of physicians and medical practices. 
Physicians were no longer viewed as “half-Gods in white”.48 Their judgment was challenged by 
patients, who tried to gain more control over their own bodies. All these developments facilitated 
the formation of a separate voice by patient organizations. Patients started to declare their 
interests just as the pharmaceutical industry, physicians and the government did. Thereby, 
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realizing that even the simplest information could have an enormous impact if broadcasted in 
newspapers, consumer groups, including patient organizations, used the media to make 
themselves heard.49  
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3. The Argument of ‘Drug Lag’ 
Starting in the early 1970s, the argument of a ‘drug lag’ in the United States, which prevented the 
rapid market introduction of potentially life-enhancing and life-saving treatments, began to stir up 
patient organizations and the media and revived the government opposition of the pharmaceutical 
industry and physicians. Even though the pharmaceutical industry and American physician 
organizations had described fear, predictions, and existing indications of delayed approvals of 
drugs and a drop in medical progress in the United States immediately after the enactment of the 
Amendments, the notion of a ‘drug lag’, referring to a relative delay in the introduction of new 
drugs in America compared to other countries, first became an overriding issue in 1972. As the 
conservative economist Sam Peltzman from the University of California presented his analysis of 
the 1962 Amendments, promoters of drug business-friendly policies and opponents of strict 
governmental regulations on drug industry endorsed the concept of a U.S. ‘drug lag’. Although 
Peltzman had focused on cost-benefit studies rather than drug approval rates, he implied the 
probable existence of a ‘drug lag’ in an article published in Science in 1973. In the article, 
Peltzman concluded, “the probable cost of delayed introduction of unusually effective drugs, an 
inevitable result of the added testing required to satisfy the amendments, exceed many fold a 
generous estimate of the value of improved drug safety that the amendments are likely to 
produce”.50 By “the probable cost of delayed introduction of unusually effective drugs”, Peltzman 
described in economic terms what the Chicago Tribune later described as potentially life-saving 
drugs that were not yet available in the United States and left American patients “needlessly 
suffering”51, thereby increasing physician and hospital bills and decreasing the country’s work 
force. According to Peltzman, such delay in the marketing of drugs in the United States was a 
consequence of the 1962 Amendments and created more costs than a concomitant improvement in 
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drug safety and efficacy could ever make up for. Of note, however, Peltzman assumed the 
Amendments to only prevent rare, well-publicized drug tragedies. In his analysis, he did not 
account for mishaps of lesser amplitude, nor did he consider other benefits from increased 
standards of scientific testing prior to drug approval such as information for physicians on how 
and when to use a specific drug.52  
As evidence for the presence of a ‘drug lag’ and a resulting drop in drug innovation in the 
United States as a consequence of the 1962 Amendments, Peltzman compared the number of 
drugs approved before the new drug law and after: 315 in 1959 versus about 80 in 1966. These 
numbers appear drastic and convincing. However, as the journalist and historian Philip Hilts 
pointed out, the number of drugs produced by the pharmaceutical industry and approved by the 
FDA had begun to decrease already in the late 1950s, making a direct connection between 
decreased drug innovation and the Amendments questionable. Furthermore, in Europe where no 
equivalent new law had been passed, there was a similar drop in the introduction of new drugs to 
the market. Hilts offered two explanations for these findings. According to Hilts, many new drugs 
in the 1950s had been so-called “me-too” drugs, very similar to already approved drugs, and 
combination-of-ingredients drugs. In the 1960s, scientists realized that not all “me-too” and 
combination-of-ingredients drugs were equally effective or even equally safe. This caused drug 
companies to back away from such drugs, thereby decreasing the total number of new drug 
developments. Furthermore, Hilts as well as many drug company leaders in the 1950s described a 
decline of new drug productions in the 1960s as inevitable because the chief scientific discoveries 
of the late 1940s and early 1950s, which had allowed for high drug development rates in the 
1950s, were mined out by the early 1960s.53  
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At the forefront of individuals and groups promoting the idea of a ‘drug lag’ in the United 
States was William Wardell of the University of Rochester School of Medicine. In 1973, Wardell 
published a landmark paper in the scientific journal Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics, 
comparing the introduction of new therapeutic drugs in the United States and Great Britain. In an 
extensive and thorough analysis of drug approval times from 1962 to 1971, Wardell found that 
nearly four times as many drugs were exclusively available in Britain. For mutually available 
drugs, the overall British lead in approval was twice that of the United States during the same 
time period. Wardell concluded from these results, “at least in numerical terms, the United States 
has lagged considerably behind Britain in the introduction of new drugs”.54 He further 
extrapolated, “over the past decade the United States has been slow to introduce and by the end of 
1971 still lacked an appreciable number of therapeutically useful drugs that had been available 
abroad for some years”.55 Thereby, Wardell’s inference is based on the assumption that the drugs, 
which had not been introduced in the United States, were therapeutically important. His analysis, 
however, provided no information on the usefulness of the drugs investigated. Wardell did point 
out, though, that despite the fact that his results might not have answered the question of the 
therapeutic implications of the differences between drug approvals in the United States and 
Britain, his results provided “the data on which such a study needs to be based”.56  
Wardell’s data was given further credibility and meaning beyond 1971 by an article on 
the drug industry that appeared in the British Medical Journal and which reported that “in 1976, 
2.6 times as many new drugs were introduced in Britain as in the United States; the ratio was 2.5 
for France and 3.6 for Germany. On average, each year the three European countries introduced 
2.9 times as many drugs as the United States.”57 Furthermore, a West German study in the late 
1970s showed that while the United States remained the leading producer of new drugs, it ranked 
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ninth of twelve countries surveyed in approving the new drugs. “Between 1961 and 1977, 23.4 
percent of all new drugs were discovered in the United States, but only 8 percent were first 
introduced in this country.”58  
Sensing a topic of public interest, American newspapers quickly responded to such 
scientific studies by presenting the results to the American public.59 In 1978, the popular 
magazine Newsweek reported that the average time taken for the approval of a new drug 
application in the United States had risen from 14 months in 1963 to 26 months in 1977.60 In 
contrast, most European countries required between 8 and 13 months.61 In 1979, the newspaper 
Chicago Tribune published an international comparison of drug approval rates, which ranked U.S. 
drug approval rates from the 15th on the anti-arthritic drug endomethacin to the 106th on the anti-
bacterial drug co-trimoxazole. The United States was ranked 40th in the approval of the anti-
tuberculosis drug carpreomycin, 65th in the approval of the anti-allergy drug chromolyn sodium, 
and 32nd in the approval of the anti-cancer drug andreomycin.62  
As to the cause of the apparent lag in the introduction of new drugs, Wardell traced it – 
like Peltzman before him – to the FDA’s rigorous Investigational New Drug procedures that were 
part of the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments, and the “increasing constraints on human 
experimentation in American hospitals and prisons”.63 According to Wardell and further 
discussed in the first case report of this paper, foreign countries had fewer requirements in these 
areas, rendering the drug approval process a faster and more efficient process.64  
 
58 Vogel, D. 1989. AIDS and the Politics of Drug Lag. Public Interest. 73-85. 
59 Clark, M., Hager, M., and Gosnell, M. 1978. How Bad the Drug Lag? Newsweek. 92:119-121. Vogel, D. 
1989. AIDS and the Politics of Drug Lag. Public Interest. 73-85. 
60 Clark, M., Hager, M., and Gosnell, M. 1978. How Bad the Drug Lag? Newsweek. 92:119-121. 
61 Smith, R. 1979. Air is Once Again Rent by Drug Lag Claims. Science. 205:283. 
62 Key, J. Aspartame Locked Up in Classic Case of FDA Inaction. Chicago Tribune, October 7 1979. 
63 Steinbrook, R. Testing New Medicines: A Bitter Pill. Chicago Tribune, July 28 1977. 
64 Ibid. 
25 
 
 
 
                                                
The pharmaceutical industry also blamed the FDA for what they called “drug lag” and 
“decrease in American health progress”, thereby implying a negative impact of slower drug 
introduction rates in the United States on the well-being of American patients. However, unlike 
Peltzman and Wardell, the pharmaceutical industry saw the problem not only in the requirements 
for more tests and better documentation since the Amendments in 1962, but also in the FDA’s 
new authority to set the norms and oversee all investigations carried out by drug manufacturers. 
This is illustrated by the complaint of Milton Mendlowitz, a researcher at Pfizer Pharmaceuticals. 
When the FDA halted his investigations because of a protocol alteration involving the increase in 
the dosage of an experimental drug given to humans, Mendlowitz filed an official complaint, 
accusing the FDA of unconscionably delaying his research and “hampering our efforts to study 
the effects of this drug”.65 He charged, “such restrictions on a clinical investigator are, in my 
opinion, most undesirable unless they can be supported by incontrovertible evidence”.66 
Furthermore, several researchers at pharmaceutical firms accused FDA officers such as Richard 
Dunham of deliberately criticizing drug applications without giving details as to what needed to 
be changed. According to the drug manufacturers, the FDA officers’ lack of good will further 
increased the already existing delays in the introduction of new drugs onto the market.67 It 
appears that the pharmaceutical industry deeply resented the position, which the drug law of 1962 
had assigned to drug manufacturers and which forced pharmaceutical companies to carry the 
burden of proof for a drug’s safety and efficacy whilst the government and the FDA set the 
standards.  
The American government responded to the widespread criticism regarding the slow 
introduction of new drugs in the United States by performing several studies. Of note are 
especially two studies: the General Accounting Office (GAO) study and a study performed by the 
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Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s (HEW) Review Panel. In early 1979, the GAO 
concluded from its 2 year study that regulators in the United States took longer than their 
European counterparts to approve new drugs.68 Tracking fourteen therapeutically significant new 
drugs, the GAO found that all but one had been introduced in Europe before they were available 
in the United States. Thereby, the lag ranged from two months to thirteen years.69 Furthermore, 
according to the GAO, the FDA regularly exceeded its statutory limit for review of a new drug (6 
month) by as much as 14 extra months70, causing the average FDA approval time to exceed the 
approval time of every other surveyed country except Sweden.71 As causes for the delayed 
introduction of new drugs in the United States the GAO report named (i) delays within the FDA, 
“FDA delays its reviews by changing reviewers in midstream, by failing to use a computerized 
information system, by writing vague guidelines, and by failing to provide feedback swiftly to 
interested companies”72, and (ii) the reluctance of manufacturers to seek approval in the United 
States. The latter appeared to be especially true for drugs with safety problems. Such drugs seem 
to have been held back from the United States by their manufacturers whilst they were offered for 
sale elsewhere.73 This dubious appearing behavior makes it more difficult to draw conclusions 
from the GAO’s data with respect to the notion of ‘drug lag’.  
Another comprehensive study of the FDA’s new drug approval process was conducted by 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s (HEW) Review Panel on New Drug 
Regulation between February 1975 and May 1977. In its study on FDA policies and practices, the 
panel evaluated the arguments connecting the 1962 Amendments, particularly the efficacy 
requirement, to a potential ‘drug lag’ in the United States. The panel, which consisted of three 
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physicians, three lawyers, and one scientist, concluded, “there was insufficient evidence to 
demonstrate a drug lag attributable to the 1962 legislation”.74 Furthermore, countering the charges 
outlined above at least partially, the panel testified, “the system of new drug regulation … is 
fundamentally sound”.75 Of course, the question remained of exactly how fundamental 
“fundamentally sound” was, since few people disputed the very existence of drug regulations. 
Most likely, the panel referred to FDA’s authority over drug efficacy studies in addition to its 
authority over drug safety.  
Although the HEW review panel viewed the new drug regulations as adequate, it pointed 
out some marked deficiencies in the law, which required improvement. According to the panel, 
the FDA’s minimum postmarketing authority constituted such a weakness.76 As explained in the 
clinical journal Annals of Internal Medicine, once the FDA had approved a drug, it only had the 
right to withdraw the drug completely from the market when there was “imminent” danger to the 
public. This clause implied a standard so strict that it had been used only once in seventeen years. 
The FDA lacked the power to adopt less drastic regulatory actions, such as limiting the 
distribution of a drug to certain settings, directing drug sponsors to conduct additional studies, 
ensuring that informed consent be obtained from those using a drug, or requiring that patients 
receive inserts describing a drug’s benefits and risks. This effectively forced the FDA to receive 
all data on a drug’s performance prior to approval, resulting in a relatively inefficient and slow 
system.77 Annals of Internal Medicine quoted the former FDA Commissioner Alexander Schmidt, 
“drug approval is now pretty much an all or nothing event. … Since approval is our “last chance”, 
 
74 Dorsen, N., and Miller, J. 1979. The Drug Regulation Process and the Challenge of Regulatory Reform. 
Ann. Intern. Med. 91:908-913. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
28 
 
 
 
                                                
we properly now tend to want all data in hand to be absolutely certain of every detail before 
approving a drug …”78  
The HEW Panel was not the only voice arguing for the basic validity of the 1962 
Amendments. Sidney Wolfe of the Health Research Group organization, a division of the 
consumer advocacy group Public Citizen, for example, reasoned that ‘drug lag’ was a poor 
argument against the existing drug regulations, because it measured mostly unimportant drugs and 
did not account for unsafe and inefficient drugs that were approved elsewhere even though they 
should not have been. Thereby, Wolfe referred to the fact that up to 95% of new drugs reaching 
the market were “me-too” drugs, which did not provide therapeutic progress and did not need to 
be rushed onto the market.79 Wolfe’s proposition of unsafe and inefficient drugs being 
inappropriately approved abroad is substantiated by Hilts’ finding that more drugs had to be 
withdrawn from the market in Britain for safety reasons than in America. Hilts pointed to a study, 
according to which 20 hazardous drugs were recalled in Britain while in the same period only 10 
drugs were withdrawn for safety reasons in the United States.80  
Proponents of the Amendments claimed that Conservatives and critics of governmental 
regulations used the concept of ‘drug lag’ to declare the need for reduced governmental control of 
the pharmaceutical industry. As Hilts pointed out, not so long before, President Kennedy had 
coined the term “missile gap” to refer to America’s lag in nuclear warheads behind the Soviet 
Union. The term became a potent political weapon. Similarly, Hilts claimed, the term ‘drug lag’ 
took on almost mythic connotations.81  
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In the light of the Carter administration’s anti-regulatory tendencies with respect to 
economic policies and despite the administration’s otherwise highly participatory attitudes, the 
FDA and its drug approval policies increasingly became the target of criticism centering on the 
notion of a ‘drug lag’ in the United States. In a time of fierce economic competition between the 
United States and Japan, the ‘drug lag’ was presented as proof that the erroneous drug regulations 
passed in 1962 had damaged the ability of American pharmaceutical firms to compete on the 
international drug market. The President’s biomedical research panel was probably the most frank 
in blaming the FDA and the 1962 Amendments for preventing innovation at pharmaceutical 
companies, “… there is a different kind of hazard to public health posed by the prolonged delays 
and great costs of developing new and potentially useful drugs which the FDA’s own protective 
systems have imposed. In some respects the agency has become a formidable roadblock.”82 
Thereby, the President’s panel, like Peltzman, Wardell, and the pharmaceutical industry, 
connected a relatively slow introduction of new drugs in the United States to a decrease in public 
health, assuming that the drugs, whose approval lagged behind other countries, were crucial to 
therapeutic progress.  
By the mid 1970s, even the FDA itself had endorsed the notion of a ‘drug lag’. However, 
the FDA did not see the root of the problem in its own actions, but in the legislations that it had to 
work with. In 1975, the FDA Commissioner Alexander Schmidt explained that whenever a 
controversial drug was approved, the FDA would be investigated by Congress. However, 
whenever such a drug was disapproved, no inquiry would be made. Schmidt interpreted this as 
“Congressional pressure for negative action”.83 He demanded that Congress be as willing to 
investigate charges of non-approval of a drug as it was to investigate the opposite kind of 
allegations. Schmidt claimed, “until perspective is brought to the legislative oversight function, 
the pressure from Congress for FDA to disapprove new drugs will continue to be felt, and could 
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be a major factor in health care in this country”.84 Thereby, the FDA Commissioner not only 
admitted that the FDA was inherently inclined to disapprove a drug and that this could be to the 
disadvantage of the American public, but he also pointed out who was to blame for it: Congress.  
The phrase of ‘drug lag’ in the United States was applied to “medications for problems 
ranging from asthma to heart attacks”.85 In October 1978, the magazine Newsweek reported, “the 
drug lag … had unnecessarily postponed – or blocked –the introduction of beclomethasone, a 
revolutionary asthma remedy, as well as nearly a dozen major heart drugs”.86 The journal quoted 
the cardiologist Myrvin Ellestad, “it’s a national scandal that our patients [cardiac patients] are 
deprived of lifesaving drugs available elsewhere in the world”.87 Furthermore, in a speech in 
1980, and specifically referring to propranolol, a heart drug, and adriamysis, a cancer drug, 
Democratic Representative James Scheuer of New York, chairman of a House subcommittee on 
science and technology, charged, “the FDA is contributing to needless suffering and death for 
thousands because it is denying them life-saving and life-enhancing drugs that are available 
abroad far sooner than they are here”.88  
In the context of the Carter administration’s concerns regarding America’s economic 
competitiveness, the apparent drop in drug innovation in the United States was framed as proof 
for the need for decreased regulations on the pharmaceutical industry. The notion of ‘drug lag’ 
was used as a political tool to effectively argue against governmental control over the drug 
industry.  
A prominent drug, which illustrates the notion of a ‘drug lag’ in the United States, as well 
as the emerging influence of patient voices on drug policy during the 1970s, is the anti-epileptic 
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implications of a potential ‘drug lag’ in the United States.  
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4. Sodium Valproate: Patient Voices 
The anticonvulsant properties of sodium valproate were discovered in 1963. Four years after its 
discovery, the drug was licensed in France, five years later in Britain. By 1978, sodium valproate 
was approved in most countries in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Australia, Japan and the 
Soviet Union.89  
In 1967, the French manufacturer of sodium valproate, Labaz, approached ten American 
drug companies in order to reach a license agreement over the anticonvulsant. Nine of the ten 
American drug companies declined, and it wasn’t until December 1974 that Abbott Laboratories 
agreed to apply for drug approval in the United States. The journalist James Kilpatrick saw the 
reason for this mainly in the high costs of getting a drug approved in the United States. The 
“staggering costs of winning FDA approval for a new drug”, he argued, prevented many 
companies from applying in the first place unless they could be sure that the drug would pay off 
later on.90 The latter was questionable in the case of sodium valproate, the potential market of 
which was relatively small. J. Kiffen Penry, chief of the epilepsy branch at the National Institutes 
of Health in Bethesda, explained, “it’s true that there are hundreds of thousands of people in the 
United States who could benefit from this drug, but compared with the market for drugs for 
hypertension or antibiotics, that’s relatively few”.91 In any case, after three more years, in 
September 1977, Abbot Laboratories supplied its new drug application to the FDA.  
After the Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962, the FDA required at least two 
scientifically acceptable studies demonstrating drug efficacy in order to approve a new drug. 
Several studies had been performed in Europe. However, the European studies were uncontrolled, 
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multicenter cohort surveys designed to study the efficacy of sodium valproate and to examine its 
general safety in epileptic patients resistant to other therapies.92 Although randomized controlled 
trials were considered the gold standard of clinical testing also in Europe, there was no 
randomization and no explicit control group apart from the historical control implicit in the 
clinical entry criteria of drug-resistant epilepsy in the European sodium valproate trials. The 
European conductors of the studies on sodium valproate argued that it was unethical in a disease 
such as severe, drug-resistant epilepsy, to use placebo controls or even to randomly assign 
separate active control groups. The FDA, however, did not regard the data generated by such 
studies as capable of providing “substantial evidence” of drug efficacy.93 William Wardell from 
the University of Rochester commented this, “there is little doubt among medical or scientific 
experts (including the FDA’s own advisory committees), however, that such data can 
satisfactorily demonstrate drug efficacy”.94 Whilst it can be questioned whether the FDA’s 
standards for accepting clinical trials were scientifically and medically appropriate, this did not 
change the immediate position of Abbot Laboratories.  
Knowing that the European studies on sodium valproate were highly unlikely to be 
accepted by the FDA, Abbot Laboratories recommended the so-called 1972 Suzuki study in Japan 
and a double-blinded study of seizure victims at the University of Virginia medical center known 
as the Penry-Dreifuss study. Whereas the former study fulfilled all FDA requirements, the latter 
study was rejected on the grounds of insufficient evidence for the drug’s efficacy, despite the 
unanimously recommended acceptance of the study by the national epilepsy foundation and the 
FDA’s Neurologic Drug Advisory Committee.95 Penry from the NIH pointed out that it was “very 
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strange for FDA not to accept the results of one of its own advisory committees”.96 The 
newspaper Hartford Courant described the rejection of the Penry-Dreifuss study as a “maddening 
display of bureaucratic expertise”. It claimed, “the FDA staff didn’t understand epilepsy, and 
didn’t know how to evaluate the data”.97 The Penry-Dreifuss study had been started in August of 
1976 in American academic centers in order to “help FDA by doing the studies which drug 
companies haven’t been doing”.98 One year later, in August 1977, Dr. Penry and Dr. Dreifuss had 
sent their preliminary results to Abbott, which had immediately filed with the FDA. The FDA’s 
Neurologic Drug Advisory Committee accepted the results.99 However, the FDA staff did not. Eli 
Goldensohn of Columbia University, chairman of a national epilepsy panel, explained the FDA’s 
action by its main concern of “keeping bad drugs out, not (letting) good drugs in”.100 Until now, 
the FDA had suffered politically more when it approved an unjustifiably dangerous drug than 
when it didn’t approve a useful drug. Richard Crout, director of the FDA’s Bureau of Drugs, 
elucidated, “the primary pressure from Congress and the public is to make no errors in regard to 
safety”.101 Hilts, on the other hand, argued that the FDA staff had merely followed the law. He 
pointed to the conclusions of the Supreme Court on the drug regulations at the time. In 
Weinberger versus Hynson, a landmark legal case with respect to drug law in 1973, the Supreme 
Court had declared, “clinical impressions of practicing physicians and poorly controlled 
experiments do not constitute an adequate basis for establishing efficacy … the legislative history 
of the act indicates that the test was to be a rigorous one”.102  
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Whatever the reasons for the rejection of the Penry-Dreifuss study by the FDA, it was at 
this point that patient organizations stepped in, developing a strong voice on their own. In a press 
conference in Washington on February 9th 1978, an independent panel of experts assembled by 
the Epilepsy Foundation of America, an organization of patients and their families and friends, 
stated that “further delays (in the introduction of sodium valproate) would constitute callous 
negligence”. The panel urged the FDA for “immediate approval” of sodium valproate for general 
use.103 In the following weeks, many patients and patients’ families advocated their cause in 
numerous newspaper articles in an attempt to attract public and political attention. In February 
1978, The Washington Post quoted the mother of a child with epilepsy, whose seizures could only 
be controlled with sodium valproate, “Michael’s doctor told us that if the FDA didn’t approve the 
drug, he might be allowed to keep only two patients on it [as part of an investigational program]. 
He asked us how he was to decide which two to keep.”104  
Whilst the rejection of the Penry-Dreifuss study definitely caused epilepsy patients and 
their families to raise their voices, some patients and patients’ families afflicted by epilepsy had 
tried to arouse public awareness already as early as in summer of 1977. In July 1977, in a Wall 
Street Journal article, a patient’s father described his “fight” with the FDA whilst taking his 
daughter to England for treatment with sodium valproate, “I believe we have won the fight… 
We’ll probably have the drug 18 months before we would have otherwise.”105 Thereby, the 
individual resolution of the domestic drug availability problem in seeking treatment abroad was 
by no means uncommon or restricted only to epilepsy patients in the late 1970s. In an article on 
the beta1-selective blocker metoprolol in March 1977, The Wall Street Journal reported, “thus 
Mrs. G.B.’s doctor is giving her the European drug illicitly. ‘We told her about the drug and now 
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she has someone get it for her in Europe.’”106 In addition to illustrating how patients started to 
take matters into their own hands, the above quotes also demonstrate that it was the FDA which 
was blamed for the apparent ‘drug lag’ and its consequences. As noted earlier, the FDA in turn 
had blamed Congress107, but this had at large not been recognized by the public, possibly because 
it was easier for the public to concentrate their blame on a single and isolated institution like the 
FDA and possibly also because such a diversion of the blame did not appeal to the media, thereby 
preventing the dissemination of the information.  
The media quickly caught onto the topic of a government institution such as the FDA 
depriving American citizens of a life-saving and life-enhancing drug, and published several rather 
dramatic articles on sodium valproate. In summer 1977, the Chicago Tribune focused on the 
unnecessary suffering of epilepsy patients in the United States. The newspaper quoted Richard 
Masland, neurology department chairman at Columbia University’s medical school and executive 
director of a Congressional study commission on epilepsy, who estimated that sodium valproate 
“could prevent a million otherwise untreatable seizures in the United States this year” and 
exclaimed, “it’s absolutely frustrating to realize that patients I look upon by now as personal 
friends are needlessly suffering”.108 In February 1978, The Washington Post published an article 
on sodium valproate titled “After Years of Delay, FDA Set to Approve Drug to Help Epileptics in 
U.S.” The article reported that “a drug that could help as many as a million Americans with 
epilepsy will be approved by the Food and Drug Administration …, after … months or years of 
unjustified delay”.109 At the same time, The Hartford Courant charged, “because of the super-
timidity of the Food and Drug Administration, valuable new drugs regularly are delayed for 
months or years in reaching the market; and in the specific case of sodium valproate, a needless 
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delay was the result not merely of timidity but of incompetence as well”.110 By accusing the FDA 
of incompetence, The Hartford Courant probably referred to the FDA’s interpretation of the 
Penry-Dreifuss study as inadequate despite the suggested acceptance of the study by the national 
epilepsy foundation and the FDA’s Neurologic Drug Advisory Committee. Thereby, The 
Hartford Courant didn’t stop at calling the FDA incompetent, but questioned the very existence 
of the FDA. The newspaper and one of its journalists, James Kilpatrick, the author of a political 
column titled ‘A Conservative View’ and a “staunch opponent of actual or perceived federal 
encroachments”111, asked their readers to “prompt renewed soul-searching on the whole business 
of FDA’s power over new drugs”.112 Kilpatrick expressed his opinion which included “to strip the 
FDA of authority to pronounce upon efficacy, and to leave that judgment to doctors, to patients, 
and to the marketplace at large”.113 Of note, James Kilpatrick and The Hartford Courant were not 
the only ones that called for a decrease in the FDA’s power. In an article on the delayed U.S. 
approval of the beta-blocker propranolol, the traditionally deregulatory financial newspaper The 
Wall Street Journal raised “a question, unthinkable a few years ago, about whether we should 
even have an FDA. So far as we know, no one has added up the numbers on the lives that would 
have been prolonged in the absence of regulatory delays caused by the agency. But we are 
becoming increasingly convinced that they would far outweigh the number of lives likely to be 
lost or damaged if the responsibility for safety were merely returned to the drug makers and 
doctors. It should be kept in mind that drug makers and doctors also have a vital interest in drug 
safety for their own protection.”114 In the article titled ‘100,000 Killed’, The Wall Street Journal 
directly linked the death of patients to the ‘drug lag’, which it blamed on the government’s FDA. 
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Not surprisingly, such headlines stirred up public emotions115, making them a potent political 
weapon in the battle against governmental regulations.  
The pharmaceutical industry was also frustrated about the U.S. delay in drug approvals, 
exemplified by sodium valproate, despite for different reasons. The drug manufacturer’s 
aggravation with long drug approval times in part arose from a concomitant shortening of drug 
patent periods with the extension of the drug approval process. For example, if the time for testing 
and review took up 10 years, which was not uncommon, then the life of the patent was reduced 
from the standard 17 years to only 7 years. This, in turn, markedly reduced the time available for 
the manufacturer to earn money from the drug’s marketing before the emergence of imitators 
reduced the profit from the drug to very little.116 Pharmaceutical companies thus fiercely opposed 
the FDA’s tight control measurements, which increased the time for bringing a drug onto the 
market. Joseph Stetler, head of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) exclaimed, 
“we’re jaundiced from dealing with the FDA”. He added that he did not believe that they would 
ever get faster approval.117  
In the light of such pressure, and after the submission of the results of a clinical trial by B. 
J. Wilder of the University of Florida by Abbott Laboratories, the FDA approved sodium 
valproate on February 28th 1978 for the treatment of petit mal epilepsy and for the adjunctive 
treatment of partial and multiple seizure types.118 As Eli Goldensohn of Columbia University 
pointed out, this phrase “takes in just about everything”.119 So when the FDA finally approved 
sodium valproate, it did so as broadly as physicians and patients had barely dared to hope for.120  
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The case of sodium valproate provided a favorable context for numerous Drug Regulation 
Reform Act Hearings in the U.S. Senate and Congress in the late 1970s and early 1980s, aimed to 
find measures which would shorten the approval process for drugs with new therapeutic 
potentials.121 The provisions discussed included the authorization of the FDA to approve 
potentially life-saving drugs with unique therapeutic benefits before the completion of the usual 
efficacy tests. Furthermore, several steps were debated to increase the FDA’s authority over 
already approved drugs. One of the suggested steps proposed a 5-year period of postmarketing 
surveillance at the drug sponsor’s expense if HEW deemed it useful or necessary. Intentions were 
mentioned to permit the FDA to restrict the distribution of a prescription drug within specified 
limits. Moreover, the FDA was to be permitted to require informed consent from patients using 
certain prescription drugs. The provisions also included the drop of the “imminent hazard” 
standard, suggesting instead that a drug be removed from the market if it presented an 
“unreasonable risk of illness or injury”.122 Finally, one of the measures intended to allow the FDA 
to make data on an investigational drug public prior to the drug’s approval. This prompted the 
pharmaceutical industry to respond with “extreme distaste and promises of unrelenting 
opposition” to the proposed Drug Regulation Reform Act.123 A staff member of the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association explained this response, “maybe they [people that 
FDA shows data to] are not competitors when they look at the material, but what’s to stop them 
from going to work for a competitor the next day?”124  
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The Senate’s and Congress’s task of reforming the drug law with respect to drug approval 
times did not get any easier when the FDA commissioner Jere Goyan declared in a press 
conference in 1980:  
“Our society has become overmedicated. We have become too casual about the use of 
drugs … Too many people are taking too many drugs without proper understanding of 
their potential harmful effects … I’m a therapeutic nihilist. My philosophy is the fewer 
drugs people take, the better off they are.”125  
Such a philosophy was hard to reconcile with policies which aimed to facilitate the fast approval 
of drugs, providing patients access to even more drugs that were even riskier. Furthermore, in line 
with the 1970s movement, which introduced doubt and criticism of the medical profession, 
Goyan did not trust physicians to competently and reliably protect patients from harmful drugs. 
Goyan believed physicians to be inattentive, often giving the wrong drug at the wrong time in the 
wrong amount, without regard to cost. At a physicians’ meeting, Goyan proclaimed, “I staunchly 
refuse to accept the notion that any physician, merely because he graduated from medical school 
and is currently a card-carrying member of his or her county medical society, is great, or good, or 
even tolerably competent. Too much of drug therapy has been atrociously irrational.”126 Goyan 
was thus not inclined to return to physicians any of the authority which had been assigned to the 
FDA by the 1962 Amendments, further complicating the creation of new regulatory policies.  
Opposing interests and relatively balanced power struggles in the late 1970s and early 
1980s prevented the introduction of major changes in regulatory policies. Nevertheless, the FDA 
felt enough pressure to make some serious attempts to reduce the review time for new drug 
applications. In 1978, the FDA established a three-year goal of reducing the processing time for 
 
125 Hilts, P.J. 2003. Protecting America's Health: The FDA, Business, and One Hundred Years of 
Regulation. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 207. Hawthorne, F. 2005. Inside the FDA: The Business and 
Politics Behind the Drugs We Take and the Food We Eat. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, p. 296. 
126 Hilts, P.J. 2003. Protecting America's Health: The FDA, Business, and One Hundred Years of 
Regulation. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 207. 
41 
 
 
 
                                                
“important” drugs by 25% and for all other drugs by 15%. However, despite initial developments 
which suggested reductions in drug review times, by 1985, it was difficult to escape the 
conclusion that the FDA’s attempts clearly did not reduce approval times.127 The state of affairs 
was not changed much by the passage of the Orphan Drug Act in 1983 or the Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984. The Orphan Drug Act provided special incentives to the pharmaceutical 
industry to develop and market drugs for rare diseases which would otherwise be non-
profitable.128 If fewer than 200,000 people nationwide were affected by a condition, i.e. for a 
disease with a prevalence of less than 200,000 patients or for an orphan indication, 
pharmaceutical companies were given increased commercial exclusivity, 50% tax credit for 
money spent on clinical studies, and clinical research grants from the FDA, when they attempted 
to develop a drug to treat the condition.129 The Patent Term Restoration Act, also known as the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, was a reaction to the pharmaceutical industry’s concern of shortened patent 
periods with long drug review times. By allowing patent-life extension equal to half the clinical 
phase and the entire review phase (the sum of which could not exceed five years), the Act restored 
patent terms and intended to foster innovation in the pharmaceutical industry in conjunction with 
the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act. (The latter allowed federal agencies to patent discoveries and license 
these patents to industrial enterprises, thereby facilitating the transfer of technology from the 
government and universities to industry.130) Furthermore, the Hatch-Waxman Act streamlined the 
FDA review process for generic drugs.131  
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5. AIDS and the Revision of the U.S. Drug Regulations in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
Under the presidency of Ronald Reagan, in the general atmosphere of reduced government 
regulations on the economy and a laissez-faire philosophy with respect to economic policies, the 
political pressure on the FDA and its regulatory policies increased dramatically. On this 
background, a clearly visible crisis in American drug regulation was provoked by the emergence 
and spread of HIV-AIDS. According to the journal Public Interest, the combination of three facts 
made the politics surrounding the medical treatment of AIDS unique. First, AIDS was fatal. 
Second, there were no existing drugs to treat it. Third, AIDS patients and their families and 
friends were vocal, well-organized, and aroused widespread public sympathy.132 Within the gay 
community and their supporters, AIDS activists established a sophisticated network including 
groups like the New York Gay Men’s Health Crisis, San Francisco’s Project Inform, and chapters 
of the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT-UP).133 AIDS activists were often highly 
educated, highly politicized and able to raise large budgets of hundreds of thousands of dollars for 
their cause. They could mobilize not only AIDS patients but the entire gay community and knew 
how to argue with government representatives.134 The influential AIDS activists group ACT-
UP/New York, for example, described itself as “a diverse, non-partisan group of individuals 
united in anger and committed to direct action to end the AIDS crisis”135 and was “devoted to 
political action”136. All of the above added weight to the AIDS activists’ protesting of slow drug 
approval times and their pleading for faster access to drugs.  
Thereby, the AIDS patient organizations identified the FDA as their primary target. Larry 
Kramer, a founder of the Gay Men’s Health Crisis group and a well-known author, charged, 
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“there is no question on the part of anyone fighting AIDS that the FDA consists of the single most 
incomprehensible bottleneck in American bureaucratic history – one that is actually prolonging 
the roll call of death”.137 In October 1988, more than a thousand AIDS activists demonstrated in 
front of the FDA headquarters in Rockville, Maryland. Shouting “drugs into bodies” and “FDA, 
you’re killing me”, AIDS activists attempted to “seize control” of what some called the “Federal 
Death Administration”.138 A handbook distributed by ACT-UP explained the AIDS activists’ 
position, “like corporations, [government bureaucracies] consider the data of lives as raw material 
and grist for a perpetual-motion paper mill. Human need, suffering and death count for very little 
when compared to the imperatives of orderly process and well-maintained policies.”139 Thereby, 
AIDS activists referred to ethical dilemmas such as the one of giving AIDS patients placebos in 
clinical trials, knowing that these patients would die soon. Articles in the gay press publicized the 
fate of the “sacrificial lambs” in the AZT studies, sentenced to “death by placebo”.140 One trial 
subject who had discovered he was in the placebo group exclaimed, “Fuck them. I didn’t agree to 
donate my body to science, if that is what they are doing, just sitting back doing nothing with me 
waiting until I get PCP [Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia] or something.”141 He informed a 
reporter from the gay press that he had secretly begun taking dextran sulfate, an unapproved drug 
available on the black market.142 Of note, this trial subject’s attempt to get treatment underground 
was by no means a single incident. According to Daemmrich, AIDS patients challenged the 
authority of the FDA by carrying out underground tests of new drugs, by threatening to sabotage 
NIH-sponsored trials through premature distribution of data or by ignoring trial protocols. As 
 
137 Kramer, L. The FDA's Callous Response to AIDS. New York Times, March 23 1987. 
138 Epstein, S. 1996. Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge. Berkeley: University 
of California Press, p. 255. 
139 Eigo, et al. FDA Action Handbook, p. 17. Epstein, S. 1996. Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the 
Politics of Knowledge. Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 255. 
140 Kingston, T. Death by Placebo: The Sacrificial Lambs of Protocol 019. Coming Up! September 1988, 
10-11. Epstein, S. 1996. Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, p. 214. 
141 Epstein, S. 1996. Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge. Berkeley: University 
of California Press, p. 214. 
142 Ibid., p. 214. 
44 
 
 
 
                                                
examples, Daemmrich points to participants in the 1986 trials of AZT who – like the trial subject 
above – also took dextran sulfate, imported from Japan through an underground “buyers’ club”, 
and to underground tests, which made drugs available to anyone who wanted them, such as the 
covert tests carried out on “Compound Q”.143 Daemmrich argued that AIDS patients “considered 
participation in trials a means to obtain potentially life-saving drugs, rather than a voluntary 
contribution to the more abstract common good of furthering knowledge about experimental 
therapies”.144 His conclusion is substantiated by the AIDS activist Kramer’s assertion that “AIDS 
sufferers, who have nothing to lose, are more than willing to be guinea pigs”.145  
Martin Delaney, executive director of the San Francisco-based Project Inform, viewed the 
practices of AIDS patients, including “frequent cheating, even bribery, to gain entry to studies; 
mixing of drugs by patients to share and dilute the risk of being on placebo; and rapid dropping 
out of patients who learn that they are on placebo” as a “direct result of forcing patients to use 
clinical studies as the only option for treatment”.146 Delaney warned, “it will soon be impossible 
to conduct valid clinical AIDS research in the U.S.”.147 He used such conclusions as arguments to 
reframe the very purpose of the FDA from an institution, which sought to protect the public from 
ineffective or dangerous therapies, to an establishment, which should be actively involved in 
promoting access to potentially life-saving drugs.148  
Delaney’s painting of what the FDA’s function should be resonated well with the 
American political culture at the time, which was conservative and right wing. In a general move 
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of deregulation, the White House and conservatives throughout the country sought to reduce the 
FDA’s control over the pharmaceutical industry, allowing for the faster marketing of new drugs. 
The right wing politicians hoped that such action would increase American drug innovation and 
thereby raise U.S. competitiveness on the international market. Recognizing their common 
interests, AIDS activists started to collaborate with conservative policy groups such as the 
Heritage Foundation and the Competitive Policy Institute. Alliances were formed that a few years 
earlier would have seemed upside down and most unlikely.149  
The gay community and AIDS patients felt in line with the Presidential Commission on 
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, whose chairman, Admiral James D. Watkins, charged, “we 
don’t have a system to move drugs rapidly into clinical trials”.150 Watkins predicted that “the 
FDA is going to be in very serious trouble very soon”, unless the drug approval process were 
changed. He thus suggested that the FDA receive more financial and staff resources to handle the 
new applications and that it eliminate placebo drug trials for AIDS patients, arguing that giving 
placebos to victims of AIDS was immoral.151  
The pharmaceutical industry, too, supported the Presidential Commission’s suggestions. 
The vice-president of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturer’s Association explained, “Admiral 
Watkins is calling for more resources to speed the approval of AIDS drugs that coincidentally 
would speed the approval process of all drugs. We certainly agree with that.”152  
While the FDA started to work on a response to the unified demands of AIDS patient 
organizations, the White House, and the pharmaceutical industry, California acted on its own: It 
passed a new legislation that required the state’s Department of Health Services rather than the 
FDA to handle applications for experimental AIDS drugs. Although most Californian 
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pharmaceutical firms were unable to take advantage of the new state law, California’s decision 
had considerable national political impact by forcing Congress to reexamine the FDA’s 
policies.153  
As a result of the pressures exerted on the FDA by the White House, Congress, the 
pharmaceutical industry and patient organizations, the FDA implemented a series of five 
initiatives, over the course of six years, designed to expedite the availability of drugs for seriously 
ill patients. The first initiative, known as the Treatment Investigational New Drug (IND) 
Regulation, was enacted in June 1987. The program made “promising investigational new drugs” 
available to patients for treatment purposes whilst additional data on the drug’s safety and 
effectiveness was obtained. It only applied to drugs used for the treatment of “immediately life-
threatening” and “serious” diseases for which no adequate therapy existed. The drug in question 
was required to be investigated in controlled clinical trials unless all clinical trials had been 
completed already. Furthermore, even though the manufacturing company was allowed to bill 
patients for the drug, the amount charged was not to exceed the manufacturing, research and 
development, and distribution costs.154  
In October 1988, the second initiative was enacted, the Subpart E Procedures. This 
regulation was designed to move drugs for life-threatening and serious illnesses rapidly and 
efficiently through the review phases onto the market. Subpart E allowed for a lot of flexibility in 
the evaluation procedures of the FDA. It required close collaboration between the drug 
manufacturer and the FDA from the early preclinical phase until the postmarketing surveillance. 
Efficiency and greater speed in the review process were achieved with ongoing clinical trial 
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monitoring and evaluation by the FDA, consideration of treatment IND status at the end of phase 
II trials, and the elimination of phase III clinical trials.155  
The revisions implemented in 1992 and 1993 were part of President George H. W. Bush’s 
attempt to reduce the regulatory burden on industry.156 They included the Parallel Track Policy, 
the Prescription Drug User Fee Act, and the Accelerated Approval Regulation.  
The third initiative known as the Parallel Track Policy was established in April 1992 in 
order to expand the availability of “promising investigational therapies” beyond the parameters of 
the treatment IND regulations. The parallel track initiative allowed access to an investigational 
drug as early as the end of phase I trials, provided that phase II controlled clinical trials had been 
approved by the FDA. The policy was designed for patients with AIDS and HIV-related 
conditions, and was intended for patients who were unable or unwilling to take part in ongoing 
clinical trials. The program required participating physicians to file regular safety reports. Even 
though pharmaceutical companies were allowed to charge for drugs distributed under the parallel 
track program, they were to do so only after authorization from the FDA and prices were not to 
exceed mere cost-recovery.157  
The fourth initiative or the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 was a system that 
allowed the FDA to charge companies for the drug review process, in exchange for tighter 
adherence to deadlines.158 It was created with the consent of the pharmaceutical industry and 
provided a rich source of income for the FDA, which used the money to increase staff and other 
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resources to get the applications handled more quickly.159 Furthermore, the Act contained five-
year performance goals for the FDA, including the total elimination of the agency’s backlog of 
overdue applications and the review of 90% of all new drug applications within 6 months for 
priority applications and within 12 months for standard applications.160  
The last and most radical initiative was implemented in January 1993. The so-called 
Accelerated Approval Regulation permitted the approval of a drug on the basis of its effect on a 
surrogate endpoint, which had to be reasonably likely to predict clinical outcome. Of note, no 
direct, validated link between the surrogate marker and clinical outcome was required at the time 
of approval. Examples of such surrogate markers comprised the CD4 cell count and P24 antigen 
levels with AIDS therapies. Thereby, several conditions could be attached to a drug’s approval 
under the accelerated approval program, including the initiation and timely completion of phase 
IV studies (post-approval studies). The FDA could restrict the distribution and use of the drug in 
question to specific hospitals or groups of physicians. It was also allowed to require specific tests 
prior to drug administration. Furthermore, the FDA could request the withdrawal of the drug from 
the market if the anticipated favorable outcome failed to be confirmed in post-approval studies, if 
no appropriate post-approval studies were conducted, if the restrictions on distribution and use 
were violated or were deemed insufficient, or if there was evidence that the drug was unsafe or 
not effective.161  
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6. Perspectives on the Revised Drug Regulations 
The pharmaceutical industry, political conservatives, and many patient organizations and 
community physicians welcomed the FDA reforms, claiming that legislative action was necessary 
to speed the rate at which new medical products reached the marketplace. Critical voices, 
however, feared a reduction of FDA oversight and an increase in public exposures to potentially 
unsafe and/or ineffective drugs as a consequence of the reforms.162  
The pharmaceutical industry not only fully approved of the new regulations, but even 
advocated for more radical measures to shorten drug approval times. Drug manufacturers 
expected substantial financial profits from shorter review times and the early marketing of drugs. 
In the mid 1990s, industry representatives like Sam Kazman, General Counsel for the 
Competitive Enterprise Institute in Washington DC, asked for further fundamental reform of the 
FDA guidelines. More specifically, Kazman suggested that the FDA be made a “certification” 
agency rather than a “veto” agency. Thereby, Kazman referred to a system in which a drug could 
be put on the market and sold as a non-certified drug after it had passed basic safety requirements 
equivalent to phase I trials. Kazman argued that those physicians and patients who only wanted 
FDA-certified drugs could simply not buy the drug. This system would give every physician and 
patient a choice, giving each person the individual freedom that the American society believed in, 
according to Kazman. Sam Kazman further stressed that “drug safety is not a hard and fast 
concept. At the scientific level, it is often the subject of intense disputes among experts. At the 
level of personal values and decisions, therapeutic risks that are acceptable to one person may be 
out of the questions for another.”163  
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Illustrative of the opinion of many business-friendly politicians, Louis W. Sullivan, 
physician, businessman, and Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
under President George H. W. Bush, praised in 1992, “these actions will save both lives and 
money. They will substantially improve FDA’s ability to respond vigorously to the nation’s health 
needs by allowing important new drugs to be approved months or even years earlier than was 
previously possible.”164  
Unlike the pharmaceutical industry and political conservatives, the AIDS patient 
community was split in its views on the revised drug regulations. The Treatment Action Group 
(TAG), many members of which held important positions in politically powerful AIDS 
organizations, argued that the FDA reforms had gone too far. They called for a slowing in the 
drug approval process and more extensive drug testing before approval.165 They were concerned 
about “inappropriately low standards”166, “inadequate” clinical testing and about the “virtual 
absence of data” on newly approved drugs.167 Representing Gay Men’s Health Crisis, Derek Link 
addressed the FDA in 1994 over the fast-track approval of an AIDS drug known as d4T, “you 
may be able to construct a case for approval, but there’s no way to look at the data and tell doctors 
how to use this drug”.168 TAG member and AIDS activist Spencer Cox criticized, “you’ve got 
drug companies doing these teeny-weeny trials that will never tell us if the drug delays diseases 
and death … I don’t know whether this drug would be helping me or would kill me faster”.169 
Cox explained further, “we pay huge amounts of money and we suffer through major toxicities, 
and we have to take the drug company’s word for it that these treatments work. They’re not doing 
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me any favors by approving these drugs.”170 Thereby, Link and Cox referred to the ability of 
experimental drugs to gain approval under the new regulations even if they had been tested only 
on a very small patient population. Moreover, the required trials did not determine whether a drug 
actually extended an AIDS patient’s life or eased the patient’s symptoms. Instead, the tests relied 
on surrogate markers for indication of a drug’s efficacy. AIDS activists like Derek Link and 
Spencer Cox questioned whether a specific surrogate marker such as the CD4 count could 
demonstrate a beneficial outcome, an issue which was also hotly debated by many physicians and 
scientists. David Feigel, director of the FDA’s division of antiviral drug products, admitted that 
even the FDA’s own antiviral advisory panel “clearly expressed concern about surrogate 
markers”.171 Thereby, those concerns were not limited to the mere question of which surrogate 
marker to use, but went as far as doubting the validity of surrogate endpoints in general. 
According to Feigel, “some members don’t believe surrogate markers should ever be used for 
anything”.172 However, whereas clinical trials with endpoints of life-extension and symptom-
reduction often took years, clinical trials monitoring surrogate markers could be completed within 
months, which corresponded better with the goal of accelerated drug marketing.  
In the mid 1990s, AIDS activists like Link and Cox, in conjunction with several 
physicians and scientists, argued that the rushed testing of experimental drugs under the new 
regulations prevented the acquisition of detailed information on the drugs’ side effects and 
efficacies. Link charged, “the kind of data that have come out of these clinical studies is 
uninterpretable and ambiguous. No one knows when to take them [drugs], how best to use them, 
or if the toxicities outweigh the benefit.”173 Concomitantly, members of the FDA’s Antiviral 
Drugs Advisory Committee and the National Task Force on AIDS Drug Development urged that 
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scientific standards be not sacrificed to political pressures.174 In 1995, the National Minor AIDS 
Council (NMAC) warned from underrating the need to protect individuals, “NMAC’s priorities 
are to preserve the necessary regulatory elements that would protect consumers”.175 Donald 
Abrams, assistant director of the AIDS activities division at San Francisco General Hospital, 
doubted that the clinical studies as performed for accelerated approval provided any significant 
information, “I’m not sure we’re advancing our knowledge at all”. He further questioned the right 
of patients to receive drugs prior to the completion of extensive clinical studies, “I don’t think it’s 
established in this country that people have a right to health care, so why should they have a right 
to investigational drugs?”176 Joseph L. Fleiss, an FDA consultant and professor of biostatistics at 
Columbia University’s School of Public Health was one of the scientists that opposed the reforms 
on the grounds outlined above. He expressed himself rather bluntly in the financial magazine 
Barron’s, “I think the accelerated approval process is a horror. The person who thought of it and 
saw to its acceptance should be shot.”177  
Furthermore, AIDS activists like Link and Cox, physicians and scientists accused the 
FDA of not forcing drug companies to do adequate follow-up tests, or phase IV clinical trials, on 
drugs which had been granted accelerated approval. When confronted with this criticism, FDA’s 
Feigel conceded that the agency had not focused on pressing companies to do the required post-
approval studies.178 Furthermore, Whaijen Soo, the director of virology at the pharmaceutical 
company Hoffmann-La Roche, one of the large firms involved in producing AIDS drugs, 
admitted in 1994 that the company had abandoned some of its originally planned phase IV trials. 
However, he assured that these tests would be replaced by other ones that were to start soon.179 
To Ellen Cooper, a former director of the division of antiviral drugs at the FDA and director of 
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clinical research and information at the American Foundation for AIDS Research at the time of 
the FDA reforms, the delay in phase IV trials was no surprise. She explained in a New York Times 
article in 1994 that once a drug was on the market, companies felt less compelled to conduct 
expensive studies which could, at best, confirm efficacy, but risked showing the drug not to work 
or to have unexpected side effects.180 In addition, it might be speculated that many patients 
disliked being enrolled in postmarketing trials. If patients believed a newly approved drug 
superior to other treatments, they might prefer buying the new drug over being randomized into 
groups, only one of which would actually receive the new drug. This would not only add to the 
delay in phase IV trials, but, according to the FDA’s Antiviral Drugs Advisory Committee, it 
would also underscore a “two-tier health care system” which forced poor and uninjured people to 
serve as research subjects.181  
In addition to fears of delays in postmarketing studies, critical voices of the revised drug 
regulations, including many scientists, questioned whether the FDA would withdraw a drug if the 
efficacy standard was not met within a certain time frame after accelerated approval. In 1994, 
Paul Meier, professor of statistics at Columbia University, asked, “what about the situation where 
a drug has achieved some popularity on the market? If a drug is well-hyped and selling well, 
there’s the potential to keep studies rolling and rolling.”182  
David Barr from Gay Men’s Health Crisis raised another point against the new 
regulations. What is good for an individual, he argued, may not be good for the patient 
community. Barr found it very understandable for a dying AIDS patient to want access to a 
potentially life-extending or life-saving new drug as quickly as possible, even if little data on the 
drug’s safety and efficacy were present. However, if this meant that no extensive studies would be 
performed to determine the drug’s characteristics or such studies would only be performed with 
 
180 Kolata, G. FDA Debate on Speedy Access to AIDS Drugs Is Reopening. New York Times, September 12 
1994. 
181 Antiviral Drugs Advisory Committee, Meeting #22, p. 368-69 
182 Wyatt, E.A. Still on the Fast Track. Barron's, September 19 1994. 
54 
 
 
 
                                                
much delay, then, Barr reasoned, the debate became one in part about altruism. Barr would rather 
have good information on a drug for future patients than he would have a drug without data on if, 
how, and when it should be used for individual patients right now. “It’s not just me who has to 
take the drugs, not just a group of informed people, but doctors and patients all over the world 
need to know what works. And this is not just for today. In five years there’ll be a whole lot more 
people looking for treatment options and trying to figure out what to do, what works. Part of what 
we’re doing is not just for ourselves, but is, unfortunately, planning for them also.”183 Many 
scientists argued along similar lines. They feared that the new procedures would not provide them 
with all the information they needed to direct their research and identify and potentially resolve 
the problems, which might otherwise harm millions of patients in the future.184 Scientist and 
health official Ellen Cooper viewed it as a simple question of the greatest good for the greatest 
number. According to Cooper, the individual’s right to treatment had to take a back seat to 
research which could benefit the public at large.185 Thereby, Cooper acknowledged the emotional 
difficulty of the situation, stressing how much she understood and empathized with the individual 
patient with a life-threatening disease.186  
Food and Drug Commissioner David A. Kessler responded to the criticism raised against 
the new regulations in the mid 1990s, “we stand firmly behind the idea of accelerated approval for 
life-threatening and serious diseases”.187 He argued that by changing “the rules of the game”, the 
FDA was “trying to be more flexible and trying to meet patients’ needs”.188 Moreover, Kessel 
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pointed out, “the issue here is not whether we will make a mistake”189, thereby acknowledging 
and accepting the increased risk to patients who received drugs after accelerated approval. 
Nevertheless, he admitted that the accelerated approval process could use “fine-tuning”, 
especially in finding ways to ensure the completion of follow-up studies on approved new 
drugs.190 Otherwise, Kessel reasoned, physicians and patients might not get the information they 
needed to use the new drugs.191 Furthermore, Kessel guaranteed that the threat of withdrawal of a 
drug was a real one in the absence of proof of efficacy after accelerated approval. He admitted, 
however, “we [the FDA] can do a better job of having our expectations understood”.192  
In line with the revised drug regulations and even asking for more aggressive changes, 
were AIDS activists like Martin Delaney, the director of Project Inform, an advocacy group in 
San Francisco. Delaney argued that proposals like TAG’s were a step backward and added, 
“people are not willing to go backward on the question of access”.193 Similarly, Thomas 
Merrigan, the director of the center for AIDS Research at Stanford University, spoke in favor of 
the new regulations, “a long time ago, I felt like you had to see through the complete development 
of a drug before you released it, now I think that, for AIDS, you need early release”.194 Delaney 
was very influential in constructing a consensus statement195, which reflected the wishes of 
several AIDS organizations in 1995, many of which were situated on the West Coast and included 
groups like the San Francisco AIDS Foundation, the National AIDS Treatment Advocacy Project, 
ACT-UP/Golden State.196 The consensus statement outlined suggestions to the FDA of how new 
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treatments could be brought to patients even faster without dismantling the overall system. The 
suggestions included the proposal that the FDA should “routinely encourage not only parallel 
track programs after phase I has been completed…, but also emergency access for individuals 
even before the completion of phase I”.197 Furthermore, according to the statement, the FDA’s 
current program of accelerated approval “can be improved by resolving several bottlenecks”.198 
The statement continued by listing these “bottlenecks”, giving potential resolutions, and by 
making three more general suggestions such as the right for drug developers to appeal FDA 
decisions.199  
In response to the charge of missing data on drugs approved via the accelerated pathway, 
ACT-UP activist Mark Harrington argued that the primary aim was treatment, not research, 
thereby justifying the collection of little data. Furthermore, he expressed his concern, shared by 
his group ACT-UP and other AIDS activists, of a delay in innovative treatment processes if 
physicians were overwhelmed with the paperwork required for extensive data collection. Rather 
than attempting to assemble more data, the FDA should work on further accelerating the process 
of making new drugs available to dying patients.200  
FDA Commissioner David Kessler replied to such requests by warning, “if you rush too 
much, you’re either going to do something potentially dangerous or turn down applications and 
take longer in the end”. On this point, Kessler for once had the sympathy of one of the most 
prominent FDA critics, Louis Lasagna, dean of the Sackler School of Graduate Biomedical 
Sciences at Tufts University. Lasagna admitted that the FDA could be “tempted to cut corners” to 
meet tight deadlines on reviews, a most undesirable effect.201  
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Given all these expectations, concerns and fears in the mid 1990s with respect to the new 
FDA regulations, the question arises of what the actual effects of the reforms were on drug 
approval times. The case of indinavir or Crixivan, a HIV protease inhibitor, illustrates what was 
possible after the enactment of the new initiatives: The drug was approved in 1996 under the 
accelerated approval regulation in a record time of only 42 days.202 Thereby, the approval was 
based on two controlled clinical trials which used the surrogate markers of viral load and CD4 cell 
count as evidence of indinavir’s efficacy.203  
In a paper in the American Journal of Therapeutics, Kenneth Kaitin and Michael 
Manocchia analyzed the overall effects of the new FDA regulations on the amount of time 
required for drug approvals. For the 1993-1995 new chemical entity approvals, they found a mean 
approval time which was 21% faster than that for the 1990-1992 approvals and 29% faster than 
the average approval time from 1987 to 1989. Thereby, the total phase for accelerated approval 
drugs was 36% shorter than the value for all new drug entities. Furthermore, the percentage of 
approved new drug entities first available in the United States had risen to 32% (from 8% in the 
1970s204). Kaitin and Manocchia concluded that their data offered encouraging evidence of faster 
new drug application approval times and rapid access to drugs intended to treat life-threatening 
and severe diseases.205  
Moreover, a report from the Government Accounting Office (GAO) in 2002 found a 
median decrease in approval times for standard drugs – those that provided no significant 
therapeutic benefit over drugs already on the market – from about 27 months in 1993 to about 14 
months in 2001. During the same period, according to the GAO, the median approval time for 
priority drugs – those intended to provide therapeutic benefits beyond drugs already on the market 
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– decreased from about 33 months in 1987 to 21 months in 1993 to around six months in 1997, at 
which point it remained stable.206 Already in an earlier report, the GAO had concluded that the 
FDA had met its performance goals for 1997 three years ahead of schedule.207 FDA 
Commissioner David Kessler, pleased with these results, attributed the agency’s success in 
reducing new drug review times mainly to the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) of 
1992.208 In an independent study at the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, Kenneth 
Kaitin showed the PDUFA to have indeed resulted in a “notable improvement” in FDA drug 
review times.209 The importance of the Act for the FDA was also demonstrated by the GAO, 
whose analysis showed that by 2002 industry provided about half the funds for all drug 
reviews.210  
Of interest, the GAO also reported a slight increase in drug withdrawal rates since the 
new regulations had been enacted, from 3.1% for 1985-92 to almost 3.5% for 1993-2000.211 At 
first sight, these numbers appear low. However, if one considers that at least 95% of all new drugs 
were so-called “me-too” drugs212, almost identical to drugs already on the market and of little or 
no additional therapeutic benefit, then a withdrawal rate of 3.5% does not seem so low anymore. 
(According to the National Institute for Health Care Management, 60% of new drug applications 
approved by the FDA in 1990-1999 were for drugs containing already existing active ingredients, 
and 50% of drugs approved during that time period were either new formulations or new 
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combinations of drugs already on the market.213) Similarly, the interpretation of the reported 
increase in drug withdrawal rates is not straightforward. The observed increase could be attributed 
to a loss in drug safety as a result of the FDA reforms. Alternatively, the higher consumption of 
drugs by the U.S. population in the 1990s could have made adverse side effects more likely to be 
detected, and the increase in drug withdrawal rates merely showed that the FDA had taken rapid 
action. The FDA endorsed the latter explanation, adding that higher drug consumption rates also 
made the misprescription of drugs more likely, which was another reason for withdrawal.214 The 
pharmaceutical industry, on the other hand, simply denied the existence of an increase in drug 
withdrawal rates since 1993. Jeff Trewhitt, a spokesman for the Pharmaceutical Research & 
Manufacturers of America, reported that from 1971 to 1992 the drug withdrawal rate for safety 
reasons was 2.5 to 3% and that it had been stable since then.215  
In addition to demonstrating a decrease in the approval time of new drugs, the studies 
outlined above noted a concomitant increase in the time required for research and development. 
The net result of shortened FDA review times and longer clinical development times was an only 
marginally shortened total time from the start of clinical testing to drug approval.216 A possible 
explanation of these findings may lie in the FDA’s actions to ensure high quality applications 
from the start: If applications showed severe deficiencies, the FDA refused to file them.217 
However, as Kaitin and also Peter Barton Hutt, expert on regulatory law at Harvard Law School, 
pointed out, there were numerous reasons for an increase in drug research and development times 
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during the 1990s, many of which are still poorly understood.218 An extensive discussion of those 
reasons is beyond the scope of this essay, but some suggestions and ideas are provided in the 
conclusion.  
With the resolution of the problem of ‘drug lag’, a new set of concerns arose, ranging 
from the feared effects of decreased safety and efficacy standards to a dreaded lack in scientific 
information. An additional point of concern was raised by the FDA Commissioner David Kessler 
in 1996, “we can speed up the process but that doesn’t mean everyone will have access to these 
drugs because not everyone will be able to afford them”.219 Furthermore and critical especially for 
the case of indinavir or Crixivan, limited supplies and limited manufacturing capabilities by 
Merck Pharmaceuticals prevented early wide public access to this life-saving drug.220 Whereas 
the latter issue could be resolved by building new factories to increase production221, the former 
issue remains to be a problem in the United States and will be discussed briefly later on.  
To date, there have been no more major changes in the U.S. drug law with the exception 
of the 1997 FDA Modernization Act (FDAMA). The latter intended to encourage the domestic 
transmission of new technology and enable pharmaceutical firms to reduce clinical study time. It 
also provided the FDA with a “fast track authority” to process applications for priority drugs even 
quicker.222 According to a study performed by the National Institute for Health Care 
Management, the implementation of FDAMA decreased the average number of years for clinical 
drug investigations from 6.8 years in 1990-1992 to 5.9 years in 1996-1998. Combined with the 
shorter FDA approval times secondary to the regulatory reforms of the early 1990s, FDAMA 
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caused a reduction in total drug developmental times of about 2.1 years from 1993 to 1999. For 
pharmaceutical companies, this meant a gain in effective patent life, and high profits from a drug, 
of 2.1 years on average.223 Furthermore, a process commonly known as Single-Patient 
Investigational New Drug Application or Compassionate Use Program, designed to give 
individual patients with serious conditions access to drugs as early as Phase II clinical trials, 
allowed community physicians in 2000 to take on the responsibility of clinical investigators.224 
The ability of local physicians to treat patients with non-approved investigational drugs returned 
to physicians an area of expertise and authority, which they had lost almost 40 years earlier after 
the 1962 Amendments (see above).  
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7. Gefitinib: Recent Arguments 
In recent years, several specific drug cases have again poured fuel into the debate about the U.S. 
drug regulations. One of these cases is the approval and subsequent market limitation of the 
cancer drug gefitinib or Iressa. Gefitinib was developed by the pharmaceutical company 
AstraZeneca to specifically target and inhibit the epidermal growth factor receptor (EGFR), a 
tyrosine kinase receptor which is implicated in a number of tumors. AstraZeneca focused on the 
use of gefitinib in “non-small cell lung cancer” (NSCLC) with the plan to extend the drug’s use 
later to other kinds of cancer. Lung cancer is the leading cause of cancer deaths in the United 
States. It comprises small cell lung cancer and a number of other entities, which are commonly 
referred to as non-small cell lung cancer. NSCLCs are notorious for responding very poorly to 
conventional chemotherapy. Hence, a stage III or IV NSCLC, i.e. a tumor which is not amenable 
to surgical resection, carried a very poor prognosis with a very low 5-year life-expectancy before 
the development of targeted therapies, of which gefitinib was the first agent.  
 When lung cancer patients heard about the development of gefitinib and the results of a 
small, uncontrolled clinical trial, which had shown significant tumor shrinkage by gefitinib as a 
third-line treatment in 10.6% of patients, they lobbied aggressively for rapid access to the drug.225 
Cancer patient organizations approached AstraZeneca to hand out gefitinib as part of their drug 
investigations, and they appealed to the FDA to accept gefitinib for accelerated approval.226 The 
patients were joined by the pharmaceutical industry and financial organizations in their demands 
for quicker access to gefitinib. AstraZeneca’s Chief Executive Sir Tom McKillop argued that the 
rapid approval of gefitinib would offer “further hope” to patients suffering from a “devastating 
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and life-threatening disease”.227 Such reasoning stood in arguable conflict with the results of two 
large, controlled, randomized clinical trials on first-line treatments of NSCLC, which had shown 
no benefit from adding gefitinib to standard chemotherapy.228 An article in The Wall Street 
Journal, titled ‘FDA to Patients: Drop Dead’, commented on these trials: arguing that studies and 
data could always be better, the article claimed the presence of negative study results “not [to be] 
a good reason, and certainly not an ethical one, for delaying approval”.229 The article continued to 
explain that particularly in cases of terminal disease, “any safe drug with even a “hint” of 
effectiveness should be brought to market as quickly as possible” in order to save or extend some 
lives immediately. Such action, the article pointed out, would also “give doctors the chance to 
discover uses far beyond what the FDA originally envisioned”.230  
 On this background, in September 2002, a FDA advisory panel composed of prominent 
oncologists voted 11 to 3 to recommend the accelerated approval of gefitinib as third-line 
treatment for patients with stage III or IV NSCLC, who had not responded to conventional 
chemotherapy.231 The panel argued that gefitinib fulfilled the approval requirements despite the 
concerns about the drug’s overall efficacy raised by AstraZeneca’s larger trials mentioned above, 
because the drug appeared to have helped at least some desperately ill lung cancer patients.232 The 
panel member John T. Carpenter Jr. of the University of Alabama explained his decision, “it’s 
very clear that some people are getting better and some people are getting clinical benefit”.233 The 
panel chairwoman Donna Przepiorka reasoned, “I’ve never seen a lung cancer patient whose 
cancer went away by itself. Very clearly there are patients whose cancer went away with 
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Iressa.”234 In its recommendation to approve gefitinib, the panel considered the drug’s to that date 
unique mechanism of action and the virtual absence of medical treatment strategies for advanced 
NSCLC. As described under the section on the new drug laws of the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
the fatality of a disease and the lack of alternative treatments were important criteria for accepting 
a drug into accelerated approval tracks.  
Despite its panel’s arguments, the case of gefitinib’s approval posed a dilemma for the 
FDA, because the larger studies, known as the intact trials, had already shown gefitinib not to 
provide any benefit when used as initial therapy. A FDA reviewer asked, “can FDA consider 
accelerated approval when it has already been demonstrated in the intact trials that there is no 
survival advantage?”235 The situation became even more complicated in December 2002, when 
reports of interstitial lung disease in lung cancer patients receiving gefitinib in Japan prompted the 
Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare to introduce strict precautions on gefitinib’s 
use.236 Interstitial lung disease (ILD) is characterized by global inflammation, scarring and tissue 
damage in the lungs. Of the patients, who had been taking gefitinib and had developed ILD, about 
one-third had died as a direct consequence of the ILD.237  
Given the complexity of gefitinib’s case, the FDA postponed its review deadline from 
February 5 to May 5 2003.238 The FDA intended to use the additional time in order to scrutinize 
the Japanese cancer patient deaths. Director of the Office of Drug Evaluation at the FDA, Robert 
J. Temple, explained, “we worried about that and took some extra time to review it while the 
company pulled data together”. Temple further pointed to how little was known at the time about 
the ILD cases in Japan. The FDA only knew that the Japanese postmarketing experience 
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demonstrated about a 2% rate of ILD with gefitinib use.239 It lacked detailed information on the 
actual incidents and on comparative rates in the United States or other countries. Upon the review 
of U.S. data, however, the FDA soon determined the rate of ILD in a large, U.S. based, expanded-
access program of gefitinib to be approximately 0.3%. Worldwide, the rate of ILD with gefitinib 
use was reported as about 1%. Thereupon, the FDA concluded that the rate of ILD in Japanese 
patients had not been replicated in the United States.240  
AstraZeneca responded to the Japanese and the FDA’s findings with the assertion of 
attempting to determine why the rate of ILD was higher in Japan than anywhere else. However, as 
pointed out by Mary Lynn Carver, the director of oncology public affairs at AstraZeneca, just 
because ILD occurred at all should not have deterred U.S. oncologists from prescribing gefitinib. 
According to Ms. Carver, “interstitial lung disease is something that Western oncologists are very 
familiar with and used to dealing with because it is something that does appear in advanced lung 
cancer patients regardless of what treatment they receive”.241  
The Wall Street Journal argued along similar lines, claiming that conventional 
chemotherapy had much higher rates of potentially fatal side-effects compared to gefitinib. As 
evidence for this statement, the newspaper pointed to the apparent lack of a letup in the demand 
by physicians for gefitinib. According to The Wall Street Journal, the number of patients in the 
United States who had received gefitinib through compassionate use programs had surpassed 
20,000 by January 2003. The newspaper also stressed that authorities and physicians in other 
countries were not impressed by the ILD rates in Japan and continued to call gefitinib a “miracle 
drug”. The Wall Street Journal quoted Kenneth Tsang Wah-tak of the University of Hong Kong, 
“bear in mind that lung cancer patients could die of serious complications such as pneumonia due 
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to poor immunity or the side effects of other cancer treatments”.242 The newspaper then continued 
to harshly criticize the FDA, “if only we could import such common sense for the FDA”.243 The 
Wall Street Journal accused the FDA of using the relative risk of gefitinib as a “delaying tactic” 
in the drug’s approval. It pointed out that all drugs had side effects and contra-indications and 
posed the rhetoric question “should aspirin be reconsidered just because an ulcer sufferer might 
take it?”244 Furthermore, the newspaper saw “FDA’s dithering on Iressa” as part of a general 
“disturbing pattern”.245 It argued that FDA review times had increased recently due to such delay 
mechanisms, “the agency claims the average approval time for the 17 new drug compounds (new 
molecular entities in FDA parlance) it cleared in 2002 was 15.2 months, down from 18.5 months 
in 2001 and 17.2 in 2000. But six of those drug applications were refilings, which started the 
clock all over again and artificially shortened the average ... Not counting such refiled 
applications, average approval time in 2002 was actually longer than in previous years.”246 It 
concluded that the “notoriously arrogant and defensive FDA”247 was sending “the unfortunate 
message” of “back off” to oncologists who were “desperate in the fight against the disease”.248 
According to The Wall Street Journal, “the FDA should view itself not as a gatekeeper but as a 
facilitator”.249 Considering all the measurements implemented since the late 1980s, which 
intended and effectively managed to decrease FDA drug approval times, it almost appears as if 
the process of drug approval could never be fast enough for certain entities such as The Wall 
Street Journal.  
Not surprisingly, the pharmaceutical industry agreed with The Wall Street Journal’s 
painting of the situation, although its official representatives did not demonstrate the same kind of 
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outspokenness. The chief executive of the pharmaceutical firm Genta, Raymond P. Warrell Jr., for 
example, charged, “the rigidity with which the survival hammer has been applied in the past was 
much too extreme. Are you going to reject a drug that has shown clear benefits because of a 
regulatory standard that has migrated over the last few years?”250 Thereby, he referred to the 
clinical trial end points of life-extension or -enhancement versus surrogate markers such as tumor 
shrinkage.  
Richard Pazdur, director of the FDA’s division of oncology-drug products, countered 
such accusations by pointing to the markedly shorter FDA review times in the early 2000s for 
potentially life-saving or life-extending drugs relative to previous years. According to Pazdur, 
drug approval times had been shortened, even though the FDA attempted to preserve consumer 
protection goals. In his view, the latter was a crucial role of the FDA. He argued, “I believe we 
are more reasonable in trying to get drugs out to patients”, adding “we can’t be in the position of 
potentially approving a placebo”.251  
On May 5 2003, the FDA approved gefitinib in an accelerated process. It did so on the 
basis of the small, uncontrolled phase II trial mentioned above, which had shown a tumor 
shrinkage of more than 50% in 10.6% of patients, who had previously failed conventional 
chemotherapy. According to the FDA, the approval was granted because of the low survival rate 
of advanced NSCLC patients and the lack of effective medicines for these patients. FDA 
commissioner Mark B. McClellan commented, “FDA believes it is crucial for cancer patients to 
have many safe and effective treatment options available to them in their battle against this 
disease. With the approval of Iressa, thousands of patients with lung cancer will now have access 
to an additional treatment after others haven’t worked to stop the progression of their disease.”252  
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Many cancer patients and physicians were pleased with the FDA’s decision, as was 
AstraZeneca. In the first half of 2003, Iressa sales totaled $66 million, including $18 million in 
U.S. sales after the drug’s launch in mid May. More than 37,000 American patients with NSCLC 
had received gefitinib through the preapproval expanded access program, and by the end of June, 
an estimated 10,000 patients were taking gefitinib in the United States.253 In 2003, financial 
analysts predicted yearly Iressa sales of $850 million by 2007, thereby rendering Iressa a 
significant contributor to AstraZeneca’s product cycle.254  
However, the approval of Iressa also promted several critical voices to speek up. 
Amongst the critics of gefitinib’s accelerated approval was the Public Citizen advocacy group. 
Public Citizen criticized the study which had resulted in the drug’s approval, arguing that the 
study involved an atypical subset of patients with less aggressive cancers, lacked adequate 
controls, and did not separate the effects of the drug from the effects of other medications the 
patients were taking.255 The group also called for a black-box warning to prevent gefitinib’s use 
as a first-line treatment for NSCLC. Black-box warnings were a type of warning that appeared on 
the package insert of prescription drugs. A black-box warning indicated the presence of 
substantial evidence for serious or even life-threatening side effects. It was the strongest warning 
that the FDA could require on a prescription drug.256 Public Citizen wanted to restrict the drug’s 
use to the kind of patients who had been studied in the phase II trial, which approval had been 
based on. Furthermore, the black-box warning should include information about interstitial lung 
disease. The FDA rejected the request for a black-box warning for gefitinib because of the lack of 
alternatives available to NSCLC patients who had failed conventional chemotherapy.257  
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Thomas Fleming, a biostatistician at the University of Washington and a member of the 
FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research’s Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee, 
explained why he voted against gefitinib’s approval, “as I indicated at the committee meeting, at 
the time, I quite strongly opposed the approval, either full or accelerated, based on my concern 
that there was not evidence of efficacy”. Referring to what he perceived as troubling evidence for 
the failure of pharmaceutical companies to meet the conditions attached to the accelerated 
approval of drugs, Fleming continued, “what has taken place since that time has only reinforced 
that perspective”.258 Thereby, Fleming extended his critic from the approval of gefitinib to 
accelerated approval processes in general. By receiving accelerated approval for a drug, the 
manufacturer was committed to carry out additional postmarketing or phase IV clinical trials to 
determine whether the drug conferred a real clinical benefit. Fleming was concerned that many 
phase IV trials never took place or only with much delay, and he questioned how real the FDA’s 
threat of market withdrawal in absence of efficacy data was. To substantiate his concerns, 
Fleming pointed to eight oncology drugs, which had been granted accelerated approval and whose 
follow-up studies were expected to take at least 10 years with no guarantee of ever producing 
meaningful results.259 None of these drugs were likely to be taken off the market. As one of the 
causes for the delay in postmarketing trials, Fleming identified the difficulty to enroll enough 
patients in phase IV trials. He referred to the low incentives of patients to take part in phase IV 
trials, where they would be randomized into treatment and control groups, whilst they had the 
alternative of getting the drug on the market. However, even more importantly, Fleming reasoned, 
drug manufacturers felt a reduced sense of urgency to complete follow-up studies for drugs 
approved under the accelerated pathway. According to Fleming, “sponsors, particularly industry 
sponsors, have a keen sense of urgency to develop an agent in a timely fashion, but once the agent 
is approved, there is almost a reverse motivation – you’ll market the product until it’s shown not 
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to work”.260 Fleming further explained that “no one would tolerate that in a premarket setting, but 
now there’s a clear sense of loss of urgency”. With respect to the market withdrawal of drugs, 
Fleming charged, “even when agents have been studied in confirmatory trials where benefit 
wasn’t established, there is a lack of a clear strategy of plan in the FDA oncology department on 
how to proceed – the FDA continues to allow marketing of the product”.261  
According to Robert J. Temple, the director of the Office of Drug Evaluation at the FDA, 
a drug approved under the accelerated pathway had to be removed from the market if follow-up 
clinical studies failed to demonstrate a real benefit. However, Temple admitted that the FDA 
viewed the market withdrawal of a drug very cautiously, “when a drug has proved active in a 
setting where nothing else worked, you don’t lightly remove it because a trial failed to show 
overall survival effect. You try to do other studies. You think about why the studies failed.”262 
Temple acknowledged that up until that time, no product on the market had ever been removed 
because no benefit could be established in follow-up studies.263  
Countering the charge of absent or delayed phase IV clinical trials, Richard Pazdur, the 
director of oncology-drug products at the FDA, raised the argument of follow-up studies being 
“only one aspect of accelerated approval”, despite an “extremely important” one.264 He pointed 
out that “the life of a drug is very complicated and has many avenues to demonstrate clinical 
benefit, including the practical use in the community”.265 The director of the FDA’s Office of 
New Drugs, John Jenkins, provided some numbers on the delay of phase IV trials: in September 
2003, half of all accelerated approval drugs had completed postmarketing studies, 28% had not 
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yet begun, and 1.6% were officially delayed.266 With respect to cancer drugs, Charles L. Bennett, 
a professor of medicine at Northwestern University, reported follow-up data to have been 
submitted in only 9 cases out of 26 accelerated approvals. Furthermore, in one of his surveillance 
studies, Bennett found eight examples of serious side effects discovered after the drugs were on 
the market, thereby indicating an inherent safety problem with the accelerated approval 
process.267  
Similar criticism as outlined above has also been raised in many scientific and clinical 
journals, including an editorial in the Journal of Clinical Oncology titled ‘Hurry Up and Wait: Is 
Accelerated Approval of New Cancer Drugs in the Best Interests of Cancer Patients?’268  
Proving some of the concerns mentioned above wrong, AstraZeneca conducted timely 
postmarketing studies. In December 2004, the company released its results, which failed to show 
statistical significance for survival in patients receiving gefitinib as compared to patients receiving 
a placebo.269 In response to these findings, the FDA scheduled an oncology advisory panel 
meeting for March 2005. When AstraZeneca heard of the planned meeting, the company 
suspended the promotion of Iressa in the United States and withdrew its marketing application 
with European regulatory authorities.270 In June 2005, the FDA initiated label changes for 
gefitinib, which restricted its use to patients who had previously taken it and were benefiting from 
the drug. In addition, gefitinib was to be available for use in clinical trials. However, the drug was 
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removed from the market for new patients: after September 15 2005, no new patients were 
allowed access to gefitinib unless they were part of a clinical study.271  
Maha H. A. Hussain, an advisory panel member and a professor at the University of 
Michigan, explained the FDA’s difficult position, “ethically, it’s going to be very hard to say to a 
patient who’s on it [gefitinib] and is responding, or is likely to respond when there is nothing 
else, that you can’t get it. On the other hand, I think it’s also unethical to keep it available for 
people who we know are not likely to benefit.”272 Hence, the FDA settled on a compromise as 
outlined above. Thereby, the availability of Tarceva, a drug with a very similar mechanism of 
action as Iressa, facilitated the FDA’s decision to limit access to Iressa. Unlike Iressa, Tarceva, 
which was developed and marketed by OSI Pharmaceuticals and Genentech, had demonstrated 
improved survival in clinical studies on NSCLC.273  
Not surprisingly, the FDA’s action prompted different kinds of responses. Many patients 
were distressed about gefitinib’s market withdrawal for new patients. Laurie Fenton, president of 
the Lung Cancer Alliance, a patient advocacy group, thought it unrealistic to expect a drug, which 
provided tremendous benefits for a small subset of patients, to be proven effective for the entire 
lung cancer population.274 She asked, “what about a new patient who has washed out of all other 
options? Why should Iressa not be made available to them?”275 In line with Fenton and 
countering the FDA on the suggestion of using Tarceva instead of Iressa, a lung cancer specialist 
at the University of Colorado named Paul Bunn pointed to the small but nevertheless existing 
number of patients who could not tolerate Tarceva but could use Iressa.276 Steven Walker, advisor 
to the Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, called the limitation of access 
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to Iressa “entirely unnecessary”.277 He argued that physicians were already using Tarceva before 
Iressa and charged, “it appears the FDA is waging war on cancer patients instead of on cancer”.278  
The company AstraZeneca maintained its assurance of gefitinib’s safety and stressed the 
postmarketing trial’s results for patients of Asian descent and patients who had never smoked. For 
this specific subset of lung cancer patients, the data suggested a statistically significant benefit of 
gefitinib. AstraZeneca was now looking at specific EGFR mutations, which might be associated 
with a clinical response to gefitinib. If such mutations were found, gefitinib could be approved 
specifically for patients with the mutations in question. Mary Lynn Carver from AstraZeneca 
concluded, “the science just needs to catch up in order for Iressa to have another chapter”.279  
Groups like the Public Citizen, on the other hand, argued for the complete revocation of 
gefitinib’s approval whilst allowing existing users to continue their treatment in clinical trials.280 
In early 2005, before the FDA’s decision on gefitinib’s fate, the group had filed a petition urging 
the FDA to exercise its authority by removing gefitinib entirely from the market. According to an 
analysis by the Public Citizen’s Research Group, gefitinib was linked to 83 deaths between May 
2003 and September 2004.281 Deputy Director of the Public Citizen’s Research Group, Peter 
Lurie, warned, “leaving Iressa on the market increases the likelihood that patients will be 
diverted from an effective therapy to an ineffective therapy, endangering their lives”.282 He 
added, “keeping a drug on the market while effectively telling people to avoid taking it is not an 
adequate public health response”.283  
Otis W. Brawley, an oncologist at Emory University and a member of the FDA’s panel 
evaluating gefitinib, pointed to the possibility of an erroneous approval in the first place. 
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According to Brawley, gefitinib should not have been approved until it was better understood 
who could benefit. In Brawley’s eyes “the development of this drug has been mishandled. It’s 
been mishandled by AstraZeneca. It’s been mishandled by this committee.”284  
In early 2005, discussions concerning the efficacy of AstraZeneca’s Iressa, in conjunction 
with the recent withdrawal of the multiple sclerosis drug Tysabri and inquiries into the safety of 
COX-2 inhibitors, raised concerns among several politicians. Congressional hearings were held to 
examine the FDA’s decision making capacity and to review the controversies regarding the 
approval process. During one of these sessions, Senator Mike Enzi, chairman of the Senate 
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, concluded, “we must not sacrifice safety to 
speed drugs to market”.285 However, he also argued, “we must weigh benefits and risks on the 
same scale. As patients, every time we take a drug, we take a risk, so we should not overreact to 
recent events. Attempting to achieve a zero safety risk would block millions from benefiting from 
life-saving drugs and therapies.”286 Enzi criticized the manner in which accelerated approval 
processes were carried through rather than the current drug regulations themselves. He even 
warned from reverting to a pre-1990s-reform system.  
Furthermore, in June 2005, the Democratic Representative Edward J. Markey of 
Massachusetts, a senior member of the Energy and Commerce Committee, released a report on 
the current drug approval processes. Using gefitinib’s case as evidence, Markey alleged a 
“conspiracy of silence” between the FDA and drug companies with respect to accelerated 
approval.287 Markey deemed this conspiracy responsible for a lack in detailed information on new 
drugs, “the public will never know if the products that they believe are safe and effective are no 
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better than sugar pills or may be even dangerous to their health”.288 Pazdur from the FDA 
acknowledged that the FDA was pressured by drug sponsors.289 However, he firmly believed in 
the FDA’s ability to withstand such pressures. According to Pazdur, the FDA knew that “the 
purpose of accelerated approval was not accelerated drug company profits”.290 In line with its 
previous statements calling for ever shorter approval times and minimal interference of the FDA 
after a drug’s marketing had been launched, The Wall Street Journal described Markey’s report as 
a “stunt to grab some media attention” and Markey himself as “the latest headline seeker”.291  
Presently, the biologic mechanism of gefitinib’s therapeutic action is still debated. 
According to current beliefs, the small molecule gefitinib binds and inhibits specific mutants of 
EGFR, and it is cancer patients with these mutations which respond to the drug.292  
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8. Conclusion 
For decades the tension between drug safety and drug availability has engaged the public, the 
government, physicians and the pharmaceutical industry. Drug safety could be enhanced by long 
and extensive pre-approval studies and the careful and thorough review of all trial results prior to 
a drug’s marketing. Invariably, such measures would result in long approval times and the slow 
marketing of drugs. Drug availability, on the other hand, could be increased by shifting clinical 
trials to the postmarketing phase, assigning much of the control over drug safety and efficacy to 
physicians and the pharmaceutical industry instead of the FDA, and by shortening the drug review 
process. Such measures could make potentially life-saving and life-enhancing drugs rapidly 
accessible to patients at the expense of an increased risk of drug toxicity and inefficacy.  
Focusing exclusively on drug availability increased the risk of commission or of 
approving a harmful drug, of which the most prominent example was thalidomide (at least in 
Europe where it had been approved). On the other hand, emphasizing mainly drug safety raised 
the risk of omission or of failing to approve a helpful drug, of which sodium valproate might be 
an example. Both, commission and omission mistakes could cause the death of patients and ought 
to be avoided. Hence, the basic debate centered on where the right balance lay between drug 
availability and drug safety, between short and long drug approvals, between higher risks of 
commission mistakes or omission mistakes. Or as phrased at the beginning of this essay: how 
slow is too slow, how fast is too fast?  
Before 1962, the discoveries of life-saving antibiotics laid an emphasis on drug 
availability and the rapid marketing of drugs, thereby raising the risk of commission mistakes. On 
the background of the thalidomide crisis, the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments reframed the 
issue of drug approval, giving it heavy tendencies towards the drug safety end of the spectrum. 
This was achieved by introducing stricter regulations on the pharmaceutical industry and by 
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broadening the FDA’s authority. In response, the pharmaceutical industry and many physicians 
warned from a decrease in drug innovation and drug availability and from an increased risk of 
omission mistakes. The American pharmaceutical industry feared a drop in profits and a reduction 
in their competitiveness on the international drug market. Many physicians resented the FDA’s 
new control over drug efficacy, which used to be their field of expertise. Furthermore, physicians 
were concerned that slow new drug introductions would deprive their patients of life-saving 
measures.  
During the 1970s, the term ‘drug lag’ was coined. The expression, inherently biased 
toward drug availability, was rapidly promoted by pharmaceutical companies, physicians and by 
conservative parties. It was used to reframe the question of drug approval and to fight 
governmental regulations on industry. Furthermore, on the background of general consumer 
movements and widespread criticism of medical practice and the “half-Gods in white”293, patient 
organizations made their voices heard. As illustrated by the case of sodium valproate, patients, 
too, used the notion of ‘drug lag’ as a political weapon to argue against government regulations. 
On the surface, the public opposition against a governmental institution which aimed to ensure 
public safety might seem surprising and unusual. However, in the light of the 1970s challenge of 
medical authority, patients’ fight against medical and the FDA’s paternalism appears less 
perplexing. Like the pharmaceutical industry and conservative associations, patient organizations 
demanded the faster marketing of new drugs, hoping for quicker access to life-enhancing or life-
saving measures.  
In the context of the Reagan Administration’s emphasis on deregulation and a public 
health crisis caused by the emergence of AIDS, the political pressure on the FDA rose 
enormously. The attitude had shifted from favoring a lower risk of commission to preferring a 
lower risk of omission. Eventually, the drug regulations were revised with the aim to reduce the 
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time required to market a new drug of potential therapeutic benefit for life-threatening or serious 
diseases. Whereas the pharmaceutical industry and many AIDS organizations welcomed the new 
regulations, many scientists, physicians and some AIDS activists viewed the revisions very 
critically. They feared a marked increase in commission mistakes with the accelerated approval 
procedures and the new reductions in pre-approval standards for drug safety and efficacy. 
Furthermore, concerns were raised about the ability of scientists and physicians to obtain detailed 
information on a drug approved under the accelerated pathway. Indications of delays in the 
completion of phase IV or postmarketing studies and doubts on the FDA’s determination to 
withdraw drugs from the market in the absence of timely efficacy data from follow-up studies 
further added to the fears and concerns of these critical voices. Their arguments stood in marked 
contrast to the pharmaceutical industry’s and conservative parties’ perspective, both of which 
demanded even faster market access for new drugs, going as far as suggesting a limitation of the 
FDA’s authority to merely certifying new drugs without any control over the marketing of 
experimental drugs.  
Relative to the 1962 Amendments, the revised regulations of the 1980s and 1990s 
strongly emphasized drug availability. The pendulum had swayed from focusing on drug safety to 
focusing on market availability. This development had relied heavily on the notion of a ‘drug lag’ 
in the United States. The invention of the term ‘drug lag’ can thus be viewed as a successful 
weapon in fighting governmental regulations on the pharmaceutical industry.  
Recent drug cases such as gefitinib and rofecoxib (Vioxx) renewed and reinforced the 
critiques of the revised regulations. Both, gefitinib and rofecoxib had to be withdrawn from the 
market at least partially for safety and efficacy reasons. Rofecoxib, an anti-arthritic agent of the 
COX-2 inhibitor family of drugs, was approved by the FDA in 1999. As early as in 2000, a study 
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known as VIGOR linked the drug to increased cardiovascular incidents.294 However, it was not 
until 2004 that rofecoxib was withdrawn from the market because of its cardiovascular toxicity. 
According to a study by the FDA, between 88,000 and 139,000 patients in the United States had 
suffered from a myocardial infarction or a stroke secondary to the use of rofecoxib before the 
drug’s withdrawal. Thereby, the cardiovascular incidents related to rofecoxib carried a mortality 
of 30-40% and even higher rates of severe morbidity.295 Furthermore, the legal trials following 
the Vioxx crisis revealed that the drug’s manufacturer Merck had withheld negative study results. 
More specifically, in 2001, Merck had omitted to submit data to the FDA, which demonstrated a 
statistically significant increase in mortality in patients receiving rofecoxib versus patients 
receiving placebo.296 Moreover, during an extensive analysis of 250 scientific papers on 
rofecoxib, numerous articles were identified, which had been published under the names of 
distinguished and renowned scientists and physicians, so called “opinion-leaders”. However, the 
entire work, including the texts themselves, was Merck’s very own production with no input from 
the famous scientists, under whose authorship the papers had appeared.297 According to the 
physician and industry-critic Etzel Gysling, Merck’s attempt to have influential and seemingly 
independent “opinion leaders” present their data, insinuated unwarranted objectivity and 
constituted intentional deception.298 Of note, such actions were by no means restricted to 
rofecoxib or Merck. The practices of guest authorship and ghostwriting were (and are) widely 
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endorsed and applied by the entire pharmaceutical industry.299 Critical voices of the 1990s drug 
regulations argued that an emphasis on drug safety with extensive pre-approval studies and 
careful data reviews would have prevented such practices from remaining unnoticed and patients 
from dying unnecessarily. Together with the case of gefitinib, the rofecoxib case prompted 
arguments of a current approval process, which was too fast.  
Given this background, what are the arguments for an emphasis on drug availability in 
2009? And what are the arguments for an emphasis on drug safety in 2009? 
From the pharmaceutical industry’s perspective, increased drug availability with shorter 
approval and marketing times mean increased short-term profits also in 2009 just as in the 
decades beforehand. Similarly, physicians in 2009 argue like doctors did in previous years and 
decades, namely that rapid access to new drugs might improve the health of some of their 
patients. Furthermore, a heavy focus on drug availability would shift much of the authority over 
drug safety and efficacy to physicians, a desirable outcome in many physicians’ eyes also in 2009.  
Starting in the 1970s, disease-specific patient organizations have become major advocates 
for rapid access to new drugs. Their argument lies in the devastating nature of omission mistakes. 
In their eyes, it is just as bad to impede a patient’s hope for a cure as it is to unknowingly cause 
harm by giving a patient a poorly-studied drug. In 2009, there are more than 3,100 disease-
specific advocacy groups, which press the FDA for rapid drug approvals. Unlike the patient 
organizations of the 1970s, however, most disease-specific advocacy groups in 2009 receive 
substantial funding from the pharmaceutical industry. The American Cancer Society, for example, 
receives seven to eight million dollars annually from pharmaceutical companies. The Marti 
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Nelson Cancer foundation, a small cancer-patient advocacy group based in Northern California, 
draws half of its revenue from industry.300  
Whether such industry-consumer collaborations influence the patient organizations’ focus 
on drug availability or simply allow the advocacy groups to make their voices heard can be 
argued about. The patient organizations themselves stress their independence from the 
pharmaceutical industry. Mike Katz from the International Myeloma Foundation, which obtains 
$200,000 annually from drug companies, pointed out, “the notion that a person with an active 
disease or an incurable disease is going to either approve a drug that’s a bad drug, just to help the 
company that’s making the donation, or block approval of a competing drug because he doesn’t 
want the company that funds his foundation to get injured – that is kind of ludicrous”.301 
Nevertheless, at least one member of a patient organization, namely Nancy Roach from the Marti 
Nelson foundation, admitted that there might be some undue influence from the pharmaceutical 
industry, “they [the drug companies] will put advocates in a room. They’ll say, ‘Look at this data, 
the FDA is holding [a drug] up.’ But you’re only seeing part of the story.”302 Roach further 
acknowledged the industry’s interest in patient advocates because of the political pressure, which 
patient organizations could create.  
Whatever the influences on disease-specific advocacy groups by the pharmaceutical 
industry, their pleas are earnest and are based on the sincere hope to cure some devastating 
disease. A different story is the approval of so-called life-style drugs such as Botox, Viagra, and 
Propecia (approved in 1997 for the treatment of male-pattern baldness). The marketing of these 
drugs could not happen fast enough for some members of the public. When the attorney and 
citizen activist Ralph Nader published his book ‘Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-In Dangers 
of the American Automobile’ in 1965, many Americans expressed dismay. They preferred fast, 
 
300 Hawthorne, F. 2005. Inside the FDA: The Business and Politics Behind the Drugs We Take and the Food 
We Eat. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, p. 121. 
301 Ibid., p. 121. 
302 Ibid., p. 202. 
82 
 
 
 
                                                
good-looking, and cheap cars over safe ones. Similarly, many patients now prefer the rapid access 
to life-style drugs over the drugs’ verified safety.303  
Further arguing for an emphasis on drug availability with approvals already after 
relatively small, quick and cheap clinical trials is the issue of drug safety versus drug cost. Cancer 
drug regimens, for example, can easily amount to $160,000 annually per person.304 According to 
the pharmaceutical industry, high drug prices in the United States reflect the immense expenses in 
research and development and especially also the exorbitant costs of clinical trials, frequently 
quoted around $1.2 billion per drug.305 Critics of the drug industry challenge this argument by 
pointing to the enormous proportion of drug companies’ income – sometimes estimated at 80% –, 
which goes to advertising, management and profit margins.306 However, if the drug manufacturers 
are to be believed, then one might dispute a focus on drug safety at the expense of high drug costs 
by asking questions like Jerry Mande, former aide to vice-president Al Gore and to the FDA’s 
commissioner Kessler: “If patients can’t afford a new cancer drug, can that drug be said to be 
truly effective? And if not, is the FDA fulfilling its mandate to make sure drugs are effective?” Or 
like Dan Callahan of the Hastings Institute: “If people can die because they can’t afford drugs, 
why isn’t that as bad as the fact that people may die because some drugs are unsafe?”307 In 
practice, many consumers in the United States have found a solution to the problem of high drug 
prices by buying medications abroad or online, just like patients did in order to get access to non-
FDA-approved drugs. Thereby, many American consumers are willing to buy drugs produced for 
countries with relatively low regulatory standards, demonstrating that affordable drugs are more 
important to them than high standards of drug safety.  
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Having discussed several cases for focusing on drug availability, what are the arguments 
in favor of emphasizing drug safety in 2009? The FDA commissioner Jere Goyan alluded to 
several points supporting a focus on drug safety, ranging from an overmedicated society to the 
warranted distrust of physicians. Goyan repeatedly voiced his concerns over the American people, 
who were “looking to a pill for the answer to their problems”.308 Goyan criticized the tendency of 
American patients to take a pill for their hypertension or diabetes without worrying about 
anything else such as diet and exercise. According to Goyan, rapid access to many drugs did more 
harm to the American society than it did any good and definitely did not justify decreased safety 
standards for a drug’s approval.  
Furthermore, Goyan deeply resented the thought of assigning physicians the authority 
over drug safety and drug efficacy after the accelerated approval of experimental drugs. Goyan 
doubted that physicians had the necessary competence to carry such powers. Thereby, Goyan’s 
doubts had been and continued to be substantiated by several drug incidents such as the anti-
arrhythmics case of the 1980s. For almost a decade, physicians throughout the Western world had 
widely used these drugs, believing them to be highly beneficial. Cardiologists were so convinced 
of the benefit of anti-arrhythmics that they deemed the trials which tested anti-arrhythmics against 
placebo extremely unethical. At a meeting, they openly accused one of the trial leaders, “you are 
immoral” for “withholding” the drugs from some patients and giving them placebo instead.309 The 
results of the placebo-controlled studies came as a tremendous shock to physicians. They 
demonstrated a three-and-a-half-times greater death rate in patients on anti-arrhythmics compared 
to patients on placebo. At the time, some 400,000 patients received anti-arrhythmics annually to 
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treat mild rhythm disturbances. An estimated 5000 patients had been killed annually by the 
drugs.310  
If their education and personal experience was not enough for physicians to achieve 
competence with respect to questions on drug safety and drug efficacy, one might argue that the 
professional literature could provide the required knowledge. The invalidity of this assumption is 
illustrated by the question of efficacy of the anti-depressives known as selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors or SSRIs. The FDA received 74 studies on the efficacy of SSRIs. 23 out of 
these 74 studies had never been published in professional journals. Of interest, 22 of the 23 non-
published articles found no significant therapeutic benefit of SSRIs. Furthermore, 11 studies, 
which the FDA rated as showing unclear benefit, were published as papers demonstrating a 
beneficial effect of SSRIs. Hence, whereas only 51% of the studies analyzed by the FDA 
suggested SSRIs to be effective, the vast majority of the articles published in scientific and 
medical journals indicated clear therapeutic benefits of SSRIs.311 To anyone acquainted with the 
professional literature, the apparent proof of the SSRIs’ efficacy must have seemed 
overwhelming. The bias observed in the professional literature can be enormous, precluding its 
use for purposes of achieving competency on drug safety and efficacy queries.  
Moreover, the proposed inadequacy on the physicians’ side also raises the question of a 
potential role of the FDA in controlling the off-label use of prescription drugs. Estimates on the 
frequency of off-label uses for prescription drugs in the United States center around 50%. So far, 
the FDA has no authority over what drugs are prescribed for. Thereby, safety tests for the on-label 
use of a certain prescription drug might not be transferrable to a different indication, be it because 
the new target population belongs to a different sex or age group, or be it because of different 
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dosing regimens, etc.312 Many SSRIs for example were (and are) frequently used off-label for 
teenagers, even though there was little data on the drugs’ safety and efficacy in that age group and 
even though the developing brain of adolescents was thought to be physiologically different from 
adult brains. Over the course of several years, reports started to accumulate of increased 
suicidality in teenagers on SSRIs, resulting in warnings from the FDA about the use of SSRIs in 
children and adolescents. If the issue of drug safety is to be emphasized, then one might propose 
an extension of the FDA’s authority to all uses of a drug, making off-label uses illegal. Of course, 
this would also mean that patients with poorly understood diseases, which have not been 
categorized yet and therefore do not have any drugs approved for them, could not be treated – 
unless the physician “changed” his diagnosis to one, for which the desired drug has been 
approved.  
The parents of children who have committed suicide whilst taking an SSRI form a 
different kind of consumer group as the disease-specific patient organizations mentioned above. 
Such groups of drug-damaged patients and their families and friends constitute influential 
political organizations pleading for a focus on drug safety. They argue that commission mistakes 
are worse than omission mistakes, because the former are actively induced and change the natural 
process to the worse, whereas the latter simply prevent people from gaining an improvement 
without changing the natural course of their health. Furthermore, according to drug-damaged 
patients and their families, people looking for some risky treatment can always enroll in clinical 
trials or buy a drug abroad.  
Interestingly, many scientists, including the ones involved in clinical trials, argue in favor 
of an emphasis on drug safety and extensive drug review. Not only do they feel a genuine need 
for the substantial proof of a drug’s safety prior to its approval, but they also value the 
information gained from careful pre-approval trials on when and how exactly a drug should be 
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used. Furthermore, several scientists have noticed an improvement in their operations after talking 
their projects over with FDA reviewers. The scientists point to the unique position of FDA 
reviewers, who have access to trial results from other, similar drugs, allowing them to make 
excellent suggestions on how to improve a certain study. Leigh Thompson from the drug 
company Eli Lilly, for example, recalled how in the development of one of the company’s new 
ulcer drugs, the FDA reviewers had “suggested a radical change in protocol. That way, we were 
able to track how many [patients] had ulcers go away on the drug and come back on the placebo. 
The drug acted faster than we expected and wore off faster than we realized. We got much better 
data, and it didn’t cost us more.”313 Hence, the careful review of clinical trials and their design 
does not only improve safety standards but also the quality of scientific operations.  
A further argument for a focus on drug safety rather than drug availability lies in the vast 
number of “me-too” drugs, which are brought to the market. Between 1998 and 2003, 487 drugs 
received FDA approval. Of these, 379 were “me-too” drugs and 333 were old compounds in new 
formulations or combinations. Only 67 of the 487 approved drugs were new compounds, possibly 
able to add some therapeutic benefit over the existing panel of drugs already on the market. The 
remaining 420 drugs were unlikely to be of medical relevance, and there was no reason other than 
a drug manufacturer’s profit to rush these drugs to the market.314  
Furthermore, with the birth of genetic engineering in the 1980s, the decoding of the 
human genome in 2003, and the establishment of the fields of genomics and proteomics, we are 
about to enter a new era of targeted drug therapy and personalized medicine. The drug gefitinib 
was one of the first targeted therapies approved by the FDA. In the age of personalized therapies, 
patients will be treated on the basis of their genetic susceptibilities and specific molecular 
mutations. According to a recent review in Nature Reviews: Drug Discoveries, pharmacogenetics, 
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the study of genetic variations and their effects on the response to pharmaceutical agents, will 
play a “key role” in coming years.315 With the possibility of performing genome-wide screens, 
drug companies will need to identify special patient subgroups for their drugs, as well as tests to 
quickly determine who falls into these subgroups and who does not. This is more complicated and 
more time-consuming than the generalized approaches to diseases of the past and present. 
Moreover, as indicated by the case of gefitinib, it may require more time than available under the 
accelerated approval process. In the light of the highly complex drug development processes in 
coming years, an emphasis on drug safety with stricter pre-approval guidelines and requirements 
for more extensive and longer pre-approval trials appears desirable.  
Contrary to such reasoning, the pharmaceutical industry uses the case of gefitinib to argue 
for smaller, quicker and cheaper trials. Drug manufacturers maintain that personalized drugs 
should be judged differently from generalized drugs with respect to their proofs of safety and 
efficacy. According to the pharmaceutical industry, different standards for personalized drugs are 
warranted, because these drugs would be used only by a subset of patients with specific genetic 
characteristics. Within such a subset of patients, a targeted drug is expected to have an effect in up 
to 90% of cases. This in turn would allow for small clinical trials to show statistical significance. 
According to Garo Armen from the biotechnology company Antigenics Inc., “if a product works 
in 20 percent of subjects, and the control works in 10 percent, you need a large study, carefully 
designed, to capture that small difference in benefit. But if a product works in 90 percent, you’re 
going to see that in a very small trial. And if it’s targeted to work on a very specific pathway 
that’s relevant to your disease, by definition there will not be interactions with other pathways that 
do other things.”316 By the latter, Armen attempted to justify a decreased need for safety proofs. 
In his article in Nature Reviews: Drug Discovery, Allen Roses from the Deane Drug Discovery 
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Institute at the Duke University Medical Center further pointed to the potential improvement of 
the risk-benefit ratio during the process of clinical testing if patients were excluded from long-
term clinical trials based on their DNA and adverse-event profiles and if efficacy studies were 
limited to patients expected to respond by pharmacogenetics. Thereby, Roses also stressed the 
financial incentives for pharmaceutical companies, which arose from such pharmacogenetics 
applications.317 In his eyes, the technologies of pharmacogenetics offered marked advantages to 
patients and physicians in terms of improved drug safety and efficacy, as well as to the 
pharmaceutical industry by allowing for cheaper and quicker studies. According to Roses, 
pharmacogenetics permitted a focus on drug safety concomitant with an emphasis on drug 
availability. Both, Roses and Armen had to concede, though, that “we’re not there yet”318 and 
their reasoning was based on a fair amount of speculation.  
The FDA has responded to the new scientific advances by launching the so-called Critical 
Path Initiative, which comprised FDA guidelines and specific research projects aimed “to bring 
new scientific discoveries – in fields such as genomics and proteomics, tissue engineering, 
imaging, and bioinformatics – to bear on product development, to improve the accuracy of the 
tests we use to predict the safety and efficacy of investigational medical products”.319  
Finally, another argument for extensive pre-approval studies and longer drug reviews 
comes from increasingly complex political and ethical questions raised by the approval of certain 
therapies, such as embryonic stem cell therapies, abortion medicines, mind and body altering 
drugs like anti-depressants and growth hormones for short children, drugs that might facilitate 
certain behaviors such as the HPV vaccine Gardasil, which some fear to promote promiscuity in 
adolescents, and drugs that could end lives such as the infusions used for the death penalty. The 
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approval of such drugs raises questions far beyond drug safety and drug efficacy. Just because it 
is safe and effective to give short children growth hormone to promote further growth, does this 
mean that such a therapy should be approved and applied? Extensive and time-consuming 
political and ethical discussions are warranted, which in turn preclude a focus on drug availability 
and rapid drug marketing.  
Finding the right balance between slow and fast drug approvals, between an emphasis on 
drug safety and drug availability is no easy task. From an emphasis on drug availability prior to 
1962, the drug approval system shifted to a focus on drug safety with long and extensive pre-
approval studies and reverted back to a more availability-focused system with mainly 
postmarketing surveillance. As illustrated by the case of gefitinib, the current system depends 
very heavily on postmarketing studies and thus relies on trust in the pharmaceutical industry’s 
willingness to perform adequate surveillance studies and report also negative results. So far, the 
drug industry has not given many signs that it deserves such trust, as exemplified by the case of 
rofecoxib. It should be noted that the pharmaceutical industry’s attempts to influence the drug 
approval process is just one way in which drug companies try to increase the marketing of their 
drugs. In her book The Truth About the Drug Companies: How They Deceive Us and What to Do 
About It, Marcia Angell outlines several other methods. Marcia Angell is a well known critic of 
the pharmaceutical industry who has been very influential in fighting industry-funding of 
researchers without disclosure. Despite the pharmaceutical industry’s sometimes dubious 
behavior, it appears apparent that they are not solely responsible for the present concerns 
regarding the drug approval process. In 2009, the problem of drug approval is added further 
complexity from an increasing amount of interest groups, from extremely high drug costs, and 
from new and sometimes controversial technologies, the consequences of which are not clear yet. 
Nevertheless, or just because of this intricacy, the current strong focus on drug availability with 
its reliance on the pharmaceutical industry’s ethical behavior seems inappropriate. The pendulum 
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has swayed too far into the direction of rapid drug marketing. A reframing of the issue of drug 
approval with more emphasis on careful pre-approval studies and extensive and thorough drug 
reviews seems warranted. Thereby, the question is not just one of drug regulations, but one of the 
best ways to serve the public interest.  
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